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TAILORING EMTALA TO BETTER PROTECT THE
INDIGENT:
THE SUPREME COURT PRECLUDES ONE METHOD
OF SALVAGING A STATUTE GONE AWRY
MichaelJ. Frank*

"[L]aws are not always effective simply because they are there."'

INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA) 2 to stem the tide of patient dumping, the
practice of refusing medical treatment to those unable to aford it.3 In
drafting the statute, however, Congress used both vague and broad
language,4 leaving courts to struggle with its interpretation. Some
courts have interpreted the statute in order to regulate the conduct of
*Law clerk to the Honorable Daniel A. Manion, United States Court of Appe-als for the
Seventh Circuit. All opinions expressed in this article are those of Mr. Frank and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Judge Manion or the Seventh Circuit.
'ALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 106 (1975).
2
See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub, L 99-272, 100
Stat. 82 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1998)). Because EMTALA was part of
the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, it was previously, but is now infrequentil,
referred to as "COBRA."
3See
Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 7S F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1996)
4
For example, the statute protects "any individual" in that such individual ui entitled to
"an appropriate medical screening examination." 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddta) (19941 As Judge
Boggs of the Sixth Circuit eloquently noted: "Appropriate' is one of the most v,nderful
weasel words in the dictionary, and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues inthe
drafting of legislation. Who, after all, can be found to stand up for 'inappropriate' treatment or
actions of any sort?" Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 Fd 266, 271 (6th Cir.
1990).
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hospitals beyond the statute's intended scope, thereby invading areas
traditionally left to state law.5 Specifically, EMTALA is being used as

statute, punishing hospitals for negligent
a federal medical malpractice
6

or even innocent conduct.
Unfortunately, this expansion of the statute comes at the expense
of the Act's purpose. In an effort to prevent EMTALA from being
used as a malpractice statute, thus intruding into the state common law
domain, courts began crafting devices to limit the scope of EMTALA.7

One court has required plaintiffs to allege and prove that the physician
or hospital acted with an improper motive. 8 The Supreme Court has

considered whether this motive requirement comports with the text of
the statute, examining the statute for the first time since its enactment
thirteen years ago. In Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., the Court

answered that question in the negative, 9 but left open the question of
of statutory limitations are compatible with the
whether other means
0
text of the statute.'
In the first section of this article, a brief overview of EMTALA is
provided, which discusses the general terrain and technicalities of the
5
See Cherukuri v. Shalala, 175 F.3d 446, 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (EMTALA's "literal
language reaches well beyond its stated purpose"); Vickers, 78 F.3d at 144 (noting that certain
interpretations of EMTALA would make it indistinguishable from state malpractice law).
"Thus, in nearly every decision, the courts remind the parties that "Congress did not
intend the Act to be a substitute for a state malpractice action." Power v. Arlington Hosp.
Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 869 (4th Cir. 1994). Despite this admonition, parties continue to bring
EMTALA/malpractice actions. See Vickers, 78 F.3d at 143 (An examination of both
allegations reveals, however, that they ultimately present conventional charges of misdiagnosis,
and that their reasoning would obliterate any distinction between claims of malpractice under
state lav and actions under EMTALA).
7
For example, some courts required plaintiffs to prove that they were indigent, and held
that those who could afford emergency medical treatment were outside the class protected by
EMTALA. See Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 (noting that the district court "found that it was
unlikely that Congress intended for Sec. 1395dd to be used as a general malpractice action,
because this statute addresses concerns about indigent patients rather than bringing within its
ambit all unfortunate consequences that occurred to any and all patients"); Coleman v.
McCurtain Mem'l Med. Management, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 343, 348 (E.D. Okla. 1991): Stewart
v. Myrick, 771 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (D. Kan. 1990) (only indigent "persons denied emergency
medical care possess-a private cause of action under the Act"); Evitt v. University Heights
Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495, 498 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (summary judgment for hospital is proper where
plaintiff presented no evidence that she was turned away from hospital for economic reasons).
'See Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272 (EMTALA's use of the term "appropriate" must more
correctly be interpreted to refer to the motives with which the hospital acts).
9
See Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 119 S.Ct. 685 (1999) (per curiam).
'old.
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statute as the courts have interpreted it. In addition, some of the
controversies that have arisen in interpreting the Act are also discussed.
The next section of the paper addresses the shortcomings of the Roberts
decision. Finally, this paper explains the correctness of the Sixth
Circuit's motivation for its Roberts opinion-preventing EMTALA

from becoming a malpractice statute-despite its erroneous departure
from the text of the statute. The article concludes, as many others have,

that an amendment limiting the reach of EMTALA is in the best
interest of the affected parties.
Furthermore, regardless of
congressional action on the matter, courts should limit the Act's
indefinite scope.
EMTALA: AN OVERVIEW
American hospitals have a long history of providing emergency
medical care to those in need, regardless of ability to pay." As health
care costs spiraled heavenward, some hospitals could no longer afford
this practice, and refused to treat even emergency patients absent proof

of ability to pay. 12 In the 1980s, society became more aware of this
problem, commonly known as "patient dumping." Congress realized
that more and more hospitals (primarily those with emergency rooms)
were refusing to treat indigent patients when they discovered they had

no insurance or alternative means of payment. 13 Consequently, these
patients either were refused treatment, or more commonly, were
transferred to other health care facilities.14 At a minimum, this practice
"See Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., S95 F.2d 1131, 1132 (6th Cir. 19901. Smith
v. Richmond Mem'1 Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Va. 1992).
'23See Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 691.
1 1t should be noted that long before EMTALA, the common lay, of Eaneral itate,
already recognized a duty to afford medical treatment in emergencies. See VaIdez % LymanRoberts Hosp., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 111, 114 n.1 (Tex. App. 19S2); Richard v. Adair Hoz-.p. Found,
Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Ky. App. 197S); Guerrero v,Copper Queen Hozp., 537 R2d
1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975); Mercy Med. Ctr. of Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 206 NY 2d
198, 200 (Wise. 1973); Stanturfv. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 55S, 561 (Mo, 1969); Wilmington Gen.
Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961); see generally Jonathan M. Purver,
Annotation, Liability of Hospitalfor Refusal to Admit or Treat Patient, 35 A.L.IR3d "41
(1971).
4
See H.R. REP.No. 99-241(1), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605. The Report
states: "The Committee is greatly concerned about the increasing number of reports that
hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency condition: if
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resulted in the worsening of the patients' respective conditions,'5 and
sometimes even resulted in death.
Seeking to eradicate dumping, Congress enacted EMTALA as part
of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985.
Through this statute, Congress sought to have individuals with

emergency conditions examined and treated "according to an
assessment of their medical needs, without regard to extraneous

considerations such as their ability to pay."' 16 But the extent to which
EMTALA has successfully achieved its noble goal is questionable,' 7 as
patient dumping continues. 18 Importantly, Congress did not provide
financing for the added burdens the Act placed on hospitals. 19
EMTALA is far-reaching and applies to all hospitals that
participate in the federal medicare program. 20 With respect to the Act's
requirement that hospitals screen patients to determine whether an
emergency medical condition exists, only those hospitals which have
an emergency department are governed by EMTALA.2 ' This latter
caveat has led some hospitals to avoid EMTALA's reach and its

the patient does not have medical insurance. The Committee is most concerned that medically
unstable patients are not being treated appropriately." Id.
' 5See Miller v. Medical Ctr. of S.W. La., 22 F.3d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1994). In Miller, the
patient required care from a specialist, but was denied treatment after the hospital administrator
learned that he had no insurance. Eventually, another hospital agreed to accept him, but the
initial refusal resulted in a delay of seven hours, purportedly causing the patient's condition to
worsen.6 See id.
1 Vickers, 78 F.3d at 144; see Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., 996 F.2d 708, 711 (4th
Cir. 1993).
17See Lawrence E. Singer, Look What They've Done to My Law, Ma: COBRA's
Implosion, 33 Hou. L. REv. 113, 117 (1996).
18See Luckey v. Gioia, 496 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (recounting an episode
of patient dumping).
19See Daniel N. Rosenstein, Emergency Stabilizationfor a Wounded COBRA, 9 Issurs
L. & MED. 255, 293 (1993) (suggesting that Congress reimburse hospitals for the costs of
EMTALA).
20
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (1994). This is not much of a limitation, as most
hospitals participate in the "federal Medicare program - a lucrative source of institutional
revenue." Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir. 1995). For a brief
discussion of purported ways in which managed care organizations evade EMTALA duties see
John A.21 Marx, Emergency Medicine, 277 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1998).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994); Brooks, 996 F.2d at 715 (EMTALA imposes
"limited duty on hospitals with emergency rooms"); Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp.
Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1991) (COBRA applies to any hospital that
receives Medicare payments and has an emergency department).
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associated expenses, at 22least for the screening requirement, by closing
their emergency rooms.

While a hospital's duty to screen arises when an individual

"comes to the emergency department," 23 courts have differed on

EMTALA's applicability to patients seeking treatment at other hospital
departments. The text of the statute indicates that the duty to stabilize

an emergency condition arises whenever an individual "comes to a
hospital, ' 24 and the duty to transfer arises if an individual is "at a
hospital., 25

"When Congress includes particular language in one

statutory provision, and excludes it in another [courts] generally
assume that Congress did so intentionally."26 Thus, because Congress
omitted the words "emergency

department"

from EMTALA's

specification that patients be stabilized before transfer, Congress
intended that a hospital stabilize a patient's emergency medical

condition even when an individual comes to another department of the
hospital. This would include hospital visits for routine examination or
extended treatment, and not just for emergency treatment in the
emergency room. 2 7 The text compels this interpretation, 23 and failing to

22See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHIT To HE'Mm CA E?
95 (1997) (noting that hospitals can "reduce their statutory exposure by shrinLing their ER
capacity or closing it altogether"). Whether EMTALA has had a direct effect is unclear, but
since the passage of the Act, more than 700 hospitals have eliminated or sub=tantially
downsized their emergency care departments. See id. at 97.
2'42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994); see Rios v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp Sys, 935 S W2d 799.
803 (Tex. App. 1996) (While we agree that basing a decision upon v;hich door a patient entered
seemingly places form over substance ... a failure to screen claim requires pre:enrtment in the
emergency department).
2442 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1994).
2-42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1994).
26
Uniroyal Chem. Co., Inc. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 233, 244 n 9 5flti Cir 1992)
(citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); United States '. Wong IJim Bo, 472
F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) ([W]here Congress has carefully employed a term in one place
and excluded
it in another, it should not be implied %,.hereexcluded)),
27
See Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1999); Urban, 43 F,3d at 524,
Reynolds v. Mercy Hosp., 861 F. Supp. 214, 222 (WD.NY. 1994) (plaintiff admitted by
private physician for pre-arranged surgical procedure); McIntyre v. Schick, 795 F Supp, 777,
781 (E.D. Va. 1992) (to state a claim for failure to stabilize, a plaintiff need not allege that le
sought treatment at the hospital's emergency room, but only that she sought treatment at the
hospital); Helton v. Phelps County Reg'l Med. Ctr., 794 F. Supp. 332. 333 (E.D Mo. 19921;
Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 690 (plaintiff admitted to hospital %,henphysician ordered his transfer)
2
S5ee Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 692 (comparing the statutory language of the various
sections). This interpretation also seems consistent with the legislative purpose. As the court
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properly interpret the statute creates some curious results. 29

The

absurdity of a contrary reading can be demonstrated by considering the
case of an unborn infant whose mother was admitted to the obstetrics
department. Clearly the child has not come to the hospital's emergency
department. Under a narrow reading of EMTALA, once the infant is
born, a hospital would have no duty under EMTALA to treat any
30
emergency medical condition from which the infant might suffer.
This conclusion rests on the fact that the infant did not seek emergency
treatment in the emergency room (although his mother may have).
To prevent this and other absurd results, several courts have held
that expectant mothers admitted to the obstetrics departments of
hospitals and their unborn children are entitled to emergency medical
treatment under EMTALA despite the fact that they are not seeking aid
at the emergency room. 31 This arguably serves EMTALA's purposes
by preventing a hospital from dumping uninsured patients who come to
the hospital for non-emergency treatment, but who later need
expensive, emergency treatment. 32
Other courts reject this
interpretation and hold that the duty to stabilize (and not to transfer
before stabilization) arises only when a patient comes to the emergency
room with an emergency medical condition. 33 These courts base their
in Smith stated: "Patient dumping is not limited to a refusal to provide emergency room
treatment."
Id.
29
See United States v. Mack, 164 F.3d 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1999).
30
See Loss v. Song, No. 89-C-6952, 1990 WL 159612, at *1, 3 (N.D. Ii, Oct. 16, 1990)
(finding that an infant born with an emergency medical condition is protected by EMTALA's
stabilization requirement even though he never sought admission to the emergency room).
31
See Lopez-Soto, 175 F.3d at 173; Urban, 43 F.3d at 524 (plaintiff alleging failure to
stabilize claim originally sought treatment at the hospital's obstetrics department); Smith, 416
S.E.2d at 690 (plaintiff admitted to hospital which transferred her to another hospital after she
developed an emergency medical condition).
' 2According to a panel of the First Circuit:
[P]atient dumping is not limited to emergency rooms. If a hospital determines
that a patient on a ward has developed an emergency medical condition, it may
fear that the costs of treatment will outstrip the patient's resources, and seek to
move the patient elsewhere. That strain of patient dumping is equally
pernicious as what occurs in emergency departments, and we are unprepared to
say that Congress did not seek to curb it.
Lopez-Soto,
175 F.3d at 177.
33See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1996)
(after stabilizing patient and treating her for twenty days, hospital had no duty to resuscitate her
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opinions on the idea that EMTALA was originally designed to prevent
the dumping of patients seeking treatment at the emergency room, and
its function is not to regulate a hospital's treatment of a patient
indefinitely.
Under EMTALA, a patient "comes to the emergency department"
when the individual arrives on the hospital property and he or someone
on his behalf requests an examination or treatment. 34 Merely entering
the emergency department with an injury and asking for the location of
the admissions office is not a request for treatment.3" EMTALA only
imposes a duty on hospitals when a request is made for examination or

treatment. With respect to arriving on hospital property, a recent case
in Chicago underscores that the individual need not enter the hospital.

In 1999, Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center was fined $40,000 by
the federal government for failing to treat a gunshot victim who was
brought just beyond the hospital entrance. 36 A patient is also
considered to have come to the emergency department when a hospitalowned ambulance is transporting her, regardless of whether the
ambulance is physically at the hospital.S7
Non-hospital-owned

ambulance companies are not directly liable under EMTALA.38

under EMTALA); James v. Sunrise Hosp., S6 F.3d 885, 8S9 (9th Cir. 1996) (the sub-cction (c
transfer restrictions apply only to patients who go to the emergency room); 'filcr, 22 F.3d at
628 (duty to screen and stabilize is only triggered when an individual comes to the emergency
department); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (NM., I11 1990)
(plaintiff must allege that she went to emergency room); see Lopez-Soto v. Haaye!-: 20 F.
Supp. 2d 279, 282 (D.P.R. 1998) (plaintiff must show that she sought treatment at emergency
room, not merely that she entered the hospital through emergency room door), rev'd, 175 F,3d
170 (Ist Cir. 1999); Arrington, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1154; Fisher v. New York Health & Hocp
Corp., 989 F. Supp. 444,448 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (for both failure to screen and stabilize lcaims "a
plaintiff must allege that he went to the emergency room"); Ovens v. Presby terian Hozp. No
94-Civ-6004, 1995 WL 464950, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1995); Huekaby v.Eazt Alabo Med.
Ctr., 830 F. Supp. 1399, 1402 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
34
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994); Miller, 22 F.3d at 628; Hemandez v. Starr Count'
Hosp. 35
Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
See Rios, 935 S.W.2d at 804.
36
Laura Meckler, Chicago Hospital Finedfor Ignoring Shooting Jicti
n, STATE J.REQ,
Mar. 13,
37 1999, at 8.
See Stevison v. Enid Health Care Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990)
([H]ospital must provide screening if a request is made); Hemandez v. St.arr County Ho."p,
Dist, 30 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972 (S.D. Tex. 1999); 42 C.F.L § 4S9.24 (1998).
3Sm.EL A. ROTHENBERG, ENmRGEMNcY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 1.12 (2d ed. Supp.
1997).
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Communication with the hospital either by phone or a telemetry
39
system does not constitute "[coming] to the emergency department."

Thus, a hospital's duty to examine a patient for an emergency medical
condition arises only for patients who present themselves at the
emergency room and request an examination. 40 The duty to stabilize a
patient's emergency medical condition arises when a patient merely
"comes to a hospital." 41
Because EMTALA was designed to prevent dumping of indigent
patients, initially some courts interpreted the statute to app only to

those individuals who could not afford medical care.

However,

among the Courts of Appeals, a consensus has developed that
Congress's use of the term "any individual" means that EMTALA
43
protects any individual, regardless of whether he is indigent.
EMTALA requires hospitals to examine any patient presented at their
emergency rooms to ascertain his medical needs, and to stabilize 44any

emergency medical conditions before releasing or transferring him.

Thus, there are two basic requirements under EMTALA: 45 a
medical screening requirement to determine whether the individual has
39
See Miller, 22 F.3d at 630; Johnson v. University of Chicago Hosp., 982 F.2d 230, 233
(7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (telemetry system); Arrington v. Wong, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156
(D. Haw.
40 1998) (ambulance communicated with hospital by radio).
See Lopez-Solo, 175 F.3d at 173 (Clearly, this provision obligates hospitals to screen
only those individuals who present themselves at the emergency department); Campbell v.
Westchester County, No. 96-Civ-0467, 1998 WL 788791, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1998)
(EMTALA imposes no duty to screen where patient presented himself to outpatient department
pursuant
to pre-arranged follow-up appointment).
41
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1994).
42
See Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268; Coleman, 771 F. Supp. at 348; Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at
435-36; Evitt, 727 F. Supp. at 498; Boudreaux v. State, 687 So. 2d 596, 598, 599 (La, Ct. App.
1997); Di Gicomo v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 582 N.Y.S. 2d 887, 888 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992).
43
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) & (b) (1994); Correa, 69 F.3d at 1194 (EMTALA covers
all patients regardless of insurance status or ability to pay); Power, 42 F.3d at 857; Collins v.
DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992); Burditt v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1373 (5th Cir. 1991); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933
F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 (We hold Congress to its words,
that this statute applies to any and all patients); Lee v. Alleghany Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F.
Supp. 900, 902 (W.D. Va. 1991) (it is not the job of this court to rewrite a statute, based upon
legislative history, when the plain words are unambiguous). Notably, the panel in Gatevwood
included two present Supreme Court Justices: Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
44As shown below, the hospital has a duty to stabilize the patient before transferring or
discharging him regardless of whether the patient first appears at the emergency room.
Vickers, 78 F.3d at 142; Correa,69 F.3d at 1190; Urban, 43 F.3d at 525.
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an emergency medical condition' 46 and a stabilization or transfer
requirement, if it is determined that the individual is in labor or has an
emergency medical condition.47
More specifically, EMTALA
proscribes five general evils:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
46

failure to appropriately screen a patient for 4an emergency medical
condition within the hospital's capabilities; S
failure to stabilize a patient before transferring49 him (which
includes discharging him) when
50 the hospital knows that he has an
emergency medical condition;
failure to appropriately transfer5 ' a patient when the individual so
requests or when her physician believes that she will benefit from a
transfer to another facility; 52
refusing to accept a transferred patient," and

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (1994).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994).
48
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994); l'ickers, 78 F.3d at 142.
49
The provisions related to a transfer ordered by a physician can be violated in at leazt
four ways: (1) failing to obtain the treating physician's signature on the certification form; (2)
failing to weigh the risks and benefits of transfer;, (3) considering improper factors in making
the transfer, and (4) making the transfer without summarizing the riasks and benefits of the
transfer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii); Vargas v. Del Puerto Hosp., 93 F.3d 1202,
1204 (9th Cir. 1996) (doctor failed to summarize risks and benefits of transfer on certification
form); Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1371. Of course, a plaintiff still must show harm directly rc:ulting
from these violations to prevail in a civil suit.
5
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (1994); Baber,977 F.2d at 8S3. Like other corporate
entities, a hospital obviously cannot have knowledge. So, as with corporations, the knowledge
of the agents is imputed to the principal. See Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Brovin, 674 N.E.2d
1030, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (the law imputes an agent's knowledge, acquired vhile the
agent was acting within the scope of his agency, to the principal, even if the principal do-, not
actually know what the agent knows). But see People v. Kleiner, 664 N.Y.S.2d 704, 703 (MY.
Sup. Ct. 1997) (for violation of New York criminal statute, medical practitioner need not have
actual knowledge that the person refused treatment was in need of emergency medical
treatment).
51
An appropriate transfer entails sending the patient to a facility vith adequate cpace and
which has agreed to the transfer, via proper transportation equipment under the Eupervision of
qualified personnel. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (1994). It also entails transfemn relevant
medical records. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2)C) (1994); Dickey v. Baptist Mem'l lospNorth MS, 146 F.3d 262,264 (5th Cir. 1998) (ENTrALA claim for failing to transfer x-rays and
radiology reports).
52
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B) & (c) (1994). In some respects, this provision is an
example of the way in which the language of EMTALA can regulate behavior for ,hich it ,as
not designed. Conceivably, a hospital could violate EMTALA for failing to transfer a patient,
not because the patient was impecunious, but because the patient had an abundance of means
which the hospital desired to keep for itself.
47
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delaying the screening, stabilization, or 54
transfer of a patient in
order to inquire about his ability to pay.

Of course, a patient may refuse treatment or decide to leave before the
hospital can ascertain his condition. 55 Even under these circumstances,
however, EMTALA requires the hospital to take "all reasonable steps"
to obtain the patient's written informed refusal to be treated or
examined. 56 Moreover, in civil cases where a patient requested medical
assistance (although the hospital contended that he refused treatment),
the hospital has the difficult
burden of proving that the request for
57
treatment was withdrawn.
A violation of EMTALA entails serious financial and legal
consequences. For hospitals and physicians, failure to screen or
stabilize patients can result in a maximum civil fine of $50,000 for each
illegal act. 58 Where continuous and flagrant abuses are found, hospitals
and physicians may be precluded from participating in governmentfunded health care programs. 59 As an added incentive to comply with
the Act, hospitals (but not physicians) are subject to private suits for
violations of EMTALA.6 ° Congress also recognized that since "most
screening and transferring, as defined under the statute, will be done by
emergency room physicians, these physicians play a central role in
enforcing the statutory provisions..."61 Therefore, EMTALA prohibits
hospitals from retaliating against physicians and other health care
53

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g) (1994). This subsection, along with subsection (h), was
added in the 1989 amendments to the statute. See Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989),
' 4See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h) (1999); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)(3) (1998). Despite this
provision, some hospitals continue to evaluate emergency patients' ability to pay before
treating them. See Correa,69 F.3d at 1188; Miller, 22 F.3d at 627. Notably, mere delay in
screening can result in a finding that a medical screening evaluation was denied. See Correa,
69 F.3d at 1194 ("[We recognize that an emergency room cannot serve everyone

simultaneously.

But we agree with the court below that the jury could rationally

conclude.. .that the Hospital's inaction here amounted to a deliberate denial of screening.").
55

See Stevison, 920 F.2d at 713 ("[A] hospital has satisfied its obligations under the

statute if the patient refuses to consent to treatment.").
56

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(2) & (3); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)(2).

57

See Stevison, 920 F.2d at 713-14.

58

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (1994).

9
60See

id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994).
JUDITH WAXMAN & MOLLY MCNULTY,
PATIENT'S RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 67 (1991)
61

ACCESS TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE:
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workers who uphold the transfer provision. 62 Similarly, whistleblowers
who report violations of the statute are also
on the hospital's staff 63
protected under the Act.
Medical Screening Examination
As previously mentioned, EMTALA requires hospitals with emergency
departments to provide patients with a screening examination to
determine whether they suffer from an emergency medical condition.6
This examination must not be delayed in order to inquire into the
patient's financial or insurance status.65 The Act imposes strict liability
on hospitals for failing to perform at least a minimal examination
within the hospital's capabilities. 6 6 Yet many commentators have
noted that the law provides little guidance regarding what constitutes a
screening exam.67 Legal authorities are split on whether the quality of
a hospital's screening examination must meet an objectively reasonable
62
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i) (1994). Interestingly, EMTIALA does not expressly prohibit
hospitals from retaliating against physicians who elect to comply with EMTALA's screening
provision.
63
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i) (1994). The provision states:

A participating hospital may not penalize or take adverse action against a
qualified medical person described in subsection (c)tl)(A)(iii) or a physician
because the person or physician refuses to authorize the transfer of an
individual with an emergency medical condition that has not been stabilized or
against any hospital employee because the employee reports a violation of a
requirement of this section.
6See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
65

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd~h) (1994).
6See Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 681; Stevison, 920 F.2d at 713 (\Ve construe this statute
as imposing a strict liability standard subject to those defenses available in the act); Hutchinson
v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1992); Clark v. Baton Rouge Gen.
Med. Ctr., 657 So. 2d 741, 745 (La. CL App. 1995). Liability is "strict" in the sense that the
hospital or agents need not have an evil motive or knowledge that the patient has an emergency
medical condition to be held liable for failing to screen the patient. See. c g, Contract Courier
Servs., Inc. v. Research & Special Programs Admin., 924 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1991) (strict
liability offense does not require that offender had knowledge that he was violating the Lav, );
United States v. Carmany, 901 F.2d 76, 78 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (firearms statute impo.es strict
liability in that it does not require knowledge that the firearms were unregistered); O'Neil v.
Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 (1st Cir. 1989) ("CERCLA is a strict liability statute, so appellants
could be held liable despite their lack of knowledge").
67
Gerald A. Williams, How You Could Get Nailedfor Patient Dumping, MED. ECoiJ.
Apr. 13, 1998, at 189.
6
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standard. 68 Failing to mandate an objective standard may result in
hospitals routinely conducting cursory screening examinations. While

hospitals may avoid liability under EMTALA with these practices, the
emergency patients may suffer dangerous consequences. 69 Concerns

about hospitals evading liability simply by providing shoddy screening
examinations led the First Circuit to hold that a "hospital fulfills its
statutory duty to screen patients in its emergency room if it provides for
a screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical
'7
medical conditions that may be afflicting symptomatic patients... 0
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that "a medical screening examination
is 'appropriate' if it is designed to identify acute and severe symptoms
that alert the physician of the need for immediate medical attention to
prevent serious bodily injury." 71 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has
stated that "a complete failure to attend to a patient who presents a
condition that practically everyone knows may indicate an immediate
and acute threat to life constitutes a denial of an appropriate medical
screening examination., 72 Accordingly, that court held that EMTALA
required "a screening examination reasonably calculated to identify

critical medical conditions..."73

The District of Columbia, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, along with several states, construe the statute differently.
They base their statutory interpretation on the plain meaning of the text
68

See Trivette v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp., 507 S.E.2d 48, 51 n.l (N.C. Ct. App.
1998) (recognizing the debate among the courts concerning whether a hospital's screening
standard
69 can be so minimal as to constitute a violation of EMTALA),
See Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7 (discounting the theoretical possibility that hospitals
might endanger all of their patients by performing uniformly abbreviated examinations on
patients) (citing Karen I. Treiger, Note, PreventingPatientDumping: Sharpeningthe COBRA's
Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186 (1986)); See James, 86 F.3d at 889 ("[We are not accepting
the proposition that, so long as the hospital does so bad a job that it never even spots
emergencies,
it cannot be liable.").
70
Correa,69 F.3d at 1192 (emphasis added); see Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1305 (hospital
is liable for "failing to detect the nature of the emergency condition through inadequate
screening procedures"). But see Marshall, 134 F.3d at 323 ("a treating physician's failure to
appreciate the extent of the patient's injury or illness as well as a subsequent failure to order an
additional diagnostic procedure.. .cannot support an EMTALA claim for inappropriato
screening").
71
Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1257. At the same time, the court recognized that EMTALA
does not impose a national standard of care in screening patients. See id at 1258.
72
73Correa,69 F.3d at 1193.
1d. at 1192.
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and EMTALA's recognized purpose (preventing patient dumping),
neither of which support the view that Congress intended to create a
national standard of emergency care. 74 Hoping to prevent EMTALA
from becoming a malpractice statute, these Circuits have held that
courts should not look into the efficacy of the medical procedures
performed. Rather, the courts should only address the question of
whether the hospital's procedures are uniformly followed, regardless of
a patient's insurance status or other non-medical factors.75 Thus,
EMTALA is designed to prevent disparate treatment, rather than
incorrect diagnoses. 76 These courts recognize that,
"EMTALA" is implicated only when individuals who are
perceived to have the same medical conditions receive
disparate medical treatment. It is not implicated when
individuals who turn out, in fact to have had the same
condition receive disparate treatment. The cornerstone of an
"EMTALA" claim is the disparate treatment of individuals
perceived to have the same conditions ....
The act is intended
not to ensure each emergency room patient a correct
diagnosis, but rather to ensure that each is afforded the same
level of treatment regularly
provided to patients in similar
77
circumstances.
medical
74
See Baber, 977 F.2d at 880 (the "avowed purpose of EMTALA was
that all patients are properly diagnosed, or even to ensure that they receive

not to guarantee
adequate care").

But even the Fourth Circuit in Baber interpreted EMTALA as requiring a certain minimum
care in medical screening examinations: EMTALA "requires hospitals to develop a screening
procedure designed to identify such critical conditions that exist in symptomatic patients..."
Id. at 879. In Power, the Fourth Circuit moved even closer to the malpractice standard of the
First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. See id at S58 (recognizing that its stabdard 'blurs the line
somewhat between a malpractice claim and an EMTALA claim").
75
See Marshall, 134 F.3d at 322 (adequacy is not judged by proficiency of examination);
Summers, 91 F.3d at 1137; Vickers, 78 F.3d at 142; Repp v. Anadarko Mun. Hos, 43 F3d
519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Section 1395dd(a) does not require a hospital to provide a medical
screening in the abstract, but one that is appropriate 'within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency
department.' Thus, the statute's requirement is hospital-specific, varying vith the sp-eific
circumstances of each provider."); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116. 117 (lth Cir. 1994);
Baber, 977 F.2d at 879; Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 307 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992);
Gatewood,
933 F.2d at 1039; Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
76
See Mclver v. Hospital of St. Raphael, No. CV-9S0414154, 1999 WL 395391, at * I
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 7, 1999).
7Id The court went on to state: "Faulty screening in a particular case, as opposed to
disparate screening or no screening at all does not violate the statute." Id.
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Under this view, a violation of EMTALA occurs only if the
78
patient's treatment differed from that provided to other patients.
Accordingly, the quality and adequacy of the screening procedure are
governed by state malpractice law, and not EMTALA. 79 Some courts
have even held that the hospital is not required to show that it had a
uniform or written screening procedure.80 This holding benefits
hospitals hoping to prevent litigation because written protocols foster
lawsuits in which plaintiffs claim that hospitals should have followed
one procedure instead of another. 81 Written policies also result in legal
disputes about the meaning of key phrases in the policies.8 2 Moreover,
the lack of a written policy makes it more difficult to prove that a
hospital failed to adhere to that protocol. 83 As to the concern that this
disparate treatment standard might encourage hospitals to implement
uniformly deficient screening procedures, the courts have noted that
state malpractice law should adequately guard against this result. Thus,
when faced with this issue, one court explained:
[P]laintiffs argue that if I accept defendants' contention that
all EMTALA requires is uniform treatment, then hospitals
could avoid all liability under the statute by the simple
expedient of implementing uniform, cursory and substandard
screening procedures. This argument does not concern me.

Compliance with EMTALA is not a defense to a malpractice
78

See Marshall, 134 F.3d at 319; Blake v. Richardson, No. 98-2576, 1999 WL 319082, at
*2 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1999).
79See Trivette v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp., 507 S.E.2d 48, 51 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
80See Marshall, 134 F.3d at 319; Williams v. Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir.
1994).

81See Dinkins v. Hutzel Hosp., Inc., Nos. 94-1643, 94-1683, 1996 WL 38229, at *9 (6th

Cir. Jan. 30, 1996) ("Dinkins argues that Children's has a protocol in place that required special
treatment for a child with sickle cell disease.. .and that the hospital's failure to implement this
protocol constitutes a violation of EMTALA").
82
See Cunningham v. Fredonia Reg'l Hosp., No. 95-3350, 1996 WL 584917, at *2 (10th
Cir. 1996) (plaintiff argued that the hospital should have followed its "Initial E.R. Care For
Patient With Chest Pain" policy instead of its "Determination of Valid Emergency
Illness/Injury" policy, and that the text of Chest Pain policy was ambiguous).
83
See Power, 42 F.3d at 858 (noting difficulties of proving failure to screen case when
the hospital claims that it has no screening policy); Griffith v. Mount Carmel Med. Ctr., 831 F.
Supp. 1532, 1542 (D. Kan. 1993) (the hospital argued that because it had no standard screening
policy, the testimony by the treating doctor that he treated the plaintiff as he would any other
patient warranted summary judgment for the defendant).
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claim, and I expect that even if a hospital were sufficiently
venal that it would consider endangering its emergency room
patients in this way, it would not likely risk exposure to state
shoddy across-thelaw malpractice claims by implementing
$4
board screening examinations.

Eschewing the two approaches mentioned above, the Fourth
Circuit has adopted a middle position that utilizes a McDonnell
Douglas8 5 type of burden-shifting. S6 It first requires a plaintiff to

establish a primafacie case of disparate treatment, she must show that
in being screened she was treated differently from other similarly
situated individuals.S7 Once the plaintiff makes this showing the
hospital has the burden of producing evidence to show uniformity in its
treatment of the plaintiff and similarly situated patients.UJ If the
hospital succeeds, the plaintiff may submit evidence that the
physician's medical judgment was defective as it was exercised in the
medical screening. S9 As the Fourth Circuit stated:
We believe that the best approach, and the standard that we
now adopt, is to allow a hospital, after a plaintiff makes a
threshold showing of differential treatment, to offer evidence
rebutting that showing either by demonstrating that the
patient was accorded the same level of treatment that all other
patients receive, or that a test or procedure was not given
because the physician did not believe that the test was
reasonable or necessary under the particular circumstances of
that patient.

'4Fisher, 989 F. Supp. at 450.
SSSee McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56
See Pow,'er, 42 F.3d at 858. This burden-shifting analysis differs from the traditional
McDonnell Douglas framework used in employment discrimination cascs in several imprlant
ways. For example, the Power burden-shifting is not designed to prove intentional
discrimination (although it might lead to that conclusion), and it apparently does not drop out of
the case once it is submitted to ajury. See Wilson v. AM Gen. Corp,, 167 F-3d 1114. 1123 (7th
concurring) ("[O]nce a discrimination case has been submitted to the
Cir. 1999) (Manion, J.,
jury, the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis drops out of the picture').
SSee Power,42 F.3d at 858.
SSSee id. The court gave no indication that the hospital ever has a burden of persuasion.
89See id
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If a hospital offers such rebuttal evidence, fairness dictates
that the plaintiff should be allowed to challenge the medical
involved through her own expert
judgment of the physicians
90
testimony.
medical

But the court acknowledged that this approach was9 1blurring the line
between a malpractice claim and an EMTALA claim.
Under all three approaches, though, the primary evil sought to be
eradicated by the screening requirement is disparate treatment, failing
92
to provide the same quality or quantity of examination to all patients.
Under EMTALA, therefore, a patient can always assert a failure to
screen claim when a hospital did not follow its usual screening
examination procedures with similarly situated patients. 93 Of course,
the patient has the burden of proving disparate treatment. 94 Under the
majority approach, a screening examination procedure95 that is applied
evenly, however, need not result in a correct diagnosis.
Under the most plausible interpretation of EMTALA, then, a
hospital provides an adequate screening, when it performs its usual
screening practices in a uniform manner, whether or not it effectively
9

Id. This standard fails to heed the explanation of EMTALA's purposes in Baber, also
from the Fourth Circuit, in which the court stated that the Act was not concerned with a
physician's medical judgment. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 880.
91
See Power, 42 F.3d at 858. At the same time, the court stated, we "wholeheartedly
agree with the district court's view that there are 'sharp differences between a medical
malpractice action and an EMTALA action."' Id. at 864. Courts interpreting the Fourth
Circuit's decisions have stated that "the Act does not impose a minimum standard of care, but
rather only obligates the hospital to provide uniform care to all patients." Bohannon v. Durham
County Hosp. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (citing Baber,977 F.2d at 879),
92
See Vickers, 78 F.3d at 144 ("disparate treatment of individuals perceived to have the
same condition is the cornerstone of an EMTALA claim").
93
See Correa,69 F.3d at 1193.
94See Williams, 34 F.3d at 697; C.M. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp., 961 S.W.2d 236, 241
(Tex. App. 1997).
95
See Vickers, 78 F.3d at 143 (the "accuracy of the diagnosis is a question for state
malpractice law, not EMTALA"); Brooks, 996 F.2d at 711; Baber, 977 F.2d at 879; Gatewood,
933 F.2d at 1039. "If disparate treatment based on disparate diagnosis sufficed to raise a claim
under EMTALA, every allegation of misdiagnosis could automatically be recast as a claim
under the Act," Vickers, 78 F.3d at 144.
96
See Repp, 43 F.3d at 522; Baber, 977 F.2d at 881 (a hospital "satisfies the requirements
of Section 1395dd(a) if its standard screening procedure is applied uniformly to all patients in
similar medical circumstances"); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 (hospital satisfies screening
requirement when particular screening conforms to its standard screening procedures), But see
Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7 (Our holding, however, does not foreclose the possibility that a
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determines the presence and nature of an emergency medical
condition. 97 But even non-uniformity does not violate EMTALA if the
variations are minor. Thus, in cases where the hospital allegedly failed
to screen properly, courts have found an exception for "de minimis"
variations from a hospital's standard screening policy. 9 Furthennore,
while hospitals may have general screening procedures, they may also
tailor them to the particular patient's symptoms. 99 Finally, there is no
violation of EMTALA's screening requirement under any of the three
approaches if the hospital fails to ask screening questions where the
patient's answers would be obvious or where the information sought is
available from another source. 100 This is in accordance with the spirit
of the Act, as courts should not discourage through EMTALA liability
the expedience of a hospital's staff.
Stabilization and Transfer Standards
A hospital's duty to stabilize arises only if an individual has an
emergency medical condition. EMTALA defines an emergency
medical condition as:
a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain), such that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be
expected to result in (1) placing the health of the individual in
serious jeopardy, (2) serious impairment to bodily functions,
101
or (3) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.

future court faced with such a situation [i.e.. ineffective screening] may decide that the
hospital's standard was so low that it amounted to no "appropriate medical screening,"); CM,
961 S.W.2d at 241.
" 7See Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 n.4 (A court should only ask whether the hospital adhered to
its own procedures, not whether the procedures were adequate if followed).
93
See id at 523 (holding that minor variations from the hospital's standard screening

policy do not constitute an EMTALA violation).
'9See Baber,977 F.2d at 879 n.6.
""0See Repp, 43 F.3d at 523 (noting that although nurses did not ask specific questions
about history and pre-existing conditions, they obtained the necessary information).
101Camp v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth Hosp., 9S3 S.W.2d 876, SSO (Te\. Ct. App.
1998) (paraphrasing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)).
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A woman in labor is deemed to have an emergency medical
condition. 0 2 In essence, "an emergency medical condition exists only

if a patient is in 'imminent' danger of death or a worsening
condition
04

13
that could be life threatening,"' or is in excruciating pain.1
Interestingly, one court concluded from the text of the transfer

provision that hospitals had a duty to stabilize emergency medical
conditions about which it had no knowledge, and even conditions about

which it could not possibly have knowledge.105 Read in isolation from
the stabilization provision, 10 6 the transfer provision supports this
expansive interpretation. 0 7 This exceedingly strict liability is hardly
the most faithful reading of the text, as the text of the stabilization
provision (which is to be read in conjunction with the other provisions)
only requires stabilization when "the hospital determines that the
individual has an emergency medical condition...' 1 8 Furthermore,

strict liability for transfers of patients is not in accordance with

'0 2See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B); Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels/l-Iolywood

Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
103Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 505, 511 (N.D. Ohio 1993). aff'd, 48
F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Camp, 983 S.W.2d at 880; Watts v. Hermann Hosp., 962 S.W.2d 102,
104 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
'°4See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (1994).
'05See Carodenuto v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 593 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
106It is to avoid situations like this that the courts have created a rule of construction
requiring that one section of a statute is to be read in conjunction with the other sections of that
statute. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95
(1993) (stating that the Court's examination of statutory language is "guided not by a single
sentence or member of sentences, but look[s] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy" (internal quotations omitted)); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515 (1993)
("A statute is to be read as a whole...").
107The section of EMTALA dealing with transfers, unlike the stabilization section, has
no knowledge requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c). Therefore, under a literal reading of
the transfer section, a hospital may not transfer a patient (which includes discharging a patient)
without stabilizing his emergency medical condition, unless one of the exceptions applies, none
of which addresses a hospital's lack of knowledge about the condition. Thus, a reading of this
section that fails to incorporate the knowledge requirement of the stabilization section "leads
inescapably to the conclusion that stabilization is required if the patient 'has an emergency
medical condition' even if that condition is not diagnosed." Carodenuto,593 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
'0°See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1994).
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0 9 as it regulates medical mistakes rather than
EMTALA's purposes,
0
"1
patient-dumping.
Wisely, most courts have rejected this approach and instead have

held that EMTALA's duty to stabilize does not arise unless the hospital
first knows that the patient is suffering from an emergency medical
condition."' Thus, because of this actual knowledge limitation, the

stabilization provision is unlike EMTALA's screening provision. The
stabilization provision does not impose strict liability. i Liability for
failing to stabilize, whether the patient is eventually transferred or not,
will only attach where the examining physician had actual knowledge
of the patient's emergency condition. 113 "The Act does not hold

hospitals accountable for failing to stabilize conditions of which they
are not aware,114or even emergency conditions of which they should have
been aware."

The fact that a hospital was merely suspicious that a patient had an
emergency medical condition does not cause EMTALA's duty to
stabilize to attach."15 Moreover, knowledge of a medical condition is
109See Singer, supra note 17, at 167 (the Caradenuto "holding and its implicattons are
directly contrary to the legislative history of the Act").
'.irInc2
"1°This interpretation does serve EMTALA's purposes insofar as it encoura~c- %
in assessing a patient's medical condition. This increased vigilance should recult in tile
discharge of fewer patients (both indigent and insured) without proper treatment. It diould ala
prevent dumping by those hospitals that feign ignorance of the patient's emergency conditton,
The problem with this interpretation is its overbreadth.
"'42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1994); see Camp, 9S3 S.W.2d at G0.
"2 See Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 972 P.2d 966, 972 (Cal. 1999) 1EMTALA is not
a strict liability statute).
" 3See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) & (c) (1994) ("If.. the hoypital determincs that the
individual has an emergency medical condition..."); Marshall, 134 F.3d at 324-25; Summers v.
Baptist Med. Ctr. of Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1140 (8th Cir. 1996) ten bane) tihopital mu.t
have actual knowledge"); Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1259 (no obligation to stabilize t,ithout
knowledge of emergency medical condition); Urban, 43 F.3d at 525; Holcomb, 30 F 3d at 117,
Baber, 977 F.2d at 883; Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041; Cleland,917 F.2d at 26S-69. Without an
actual knowledge requirement, EMTALA essentially becomes a federal malpractice Statute.
F.3d at 525.
Urban,43
" 4 Viclers, 78 F.3d at 145; see Barris,972 P.2d at 972 (EMTALA impo:s liability for
failure to stabilize a patient only if an emergency medical condition is actually discovered,
rather than for negligent failure to discover and treat such a condition); Stoke:; v. Candler
Hosp., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (the failure to diagnowe a congenital
defect did not constitute a failure to stabilize under EMTALA).
"'See Camp, 983 S.W.2d at 880; Casey v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 947 S.2d 301, 304
(Tex.App. 1997) (hospital's suspicion of patient's emergency condition not sufficient; mu:t
show actual knowledge of examining physicians).
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imputed to the hospital through its physicians, but not through its
nursing staff.1 6 Although critics argue that this actual knowledge rule
encourages hospitals to remain intentionally ignorant of a patient's
condition,1 7 one court has suggested that the rule might be relaxed if it
were shown that a physician operated in bad faith and deliberately
remained ignorant of the patient's condition." 8 Despite such criticisms
of this standard, making hospitals liable for failing to treat conditions
about which the physician had no knowledge would be unduly harsh
and would serve no useful purpose. Instead, this practice would only
result in overly-cautious hospitals ordering a battery of unnecessary
tests, further delaying the treatment of the patient in question and other
emergency patients. This delay would hardly serve EMTALA's
primary objective of ensuring prompt emergency medical treatment for
the indigent. Thus, the actual knowledge rule is clearly the best one.
Stabilization occurs when "no material deterioration of the
condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability,"''1 9 or for
purposes of labor, when the mother has delivered the child and the
placenta. 120 "The statutory definition of 'stabilize' requires a flexible
12 1
standard of reasonableness that depends on the circumstances."'
Several Circuits have held that the stabilization provision is unlike the
screening provision in that stabilization requires more than just uniform
treatment of all patients. Rather, as the text of the statute states, a
hospital must prevent the material deterioration of each patient's
condition according to the capabilities of the particular hospital.122 "In
6

See Camp, 983 S.W.2d at 881; Casey, 947 S.W.2d at 304-05.
S 7See James v. Sunrise Hosp., 86 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that a knowledge
requirement might encourage hospitals to evade the statute by instructing their staffs to make
no determination as to the patient's emergency condition); Urban, 43 F.3d at 526. But the
threat of a lawsuit under EMTALA for failing to properly screen, not to mention a state
malpractice lawsuit, should provide sufficient incentive to prevent instances of deliberate
misdiagnosis.
1 8See James, 86 F.3d at 889.
" 9 Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1134 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4)(B)); see also
Eberhardt,62 F.3d at 1259 n.3; In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
hospital must prevent material deterioration of patient's emergency condition); 42 C.F.R. §
'

489.24(b)) (1998).

"22OSee
42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (1998).
1
1 Cherukuri,175 F.3d at
454.
122See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596; Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1369 (EMTALA requires
"treatment that medical experts agree would prevent the threatening and severe consequences
of' the patient's condition while she was in transit); see also Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1305
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comparison with the question of the appropriateness of the
examination, the Act leaves no doubt that the question of whether the
patient's medical condition was stabilized should be judged from the
perspective of professional standards rather than standards established
by each hospital."' 123 Thus, the extent of the hospital's duty to stabilize
is patient-specific. 124 The Fourth Circuit has further suggested that
stabilizing treatment must be provided even when it would violate the
125
hospital's ethical principles or is contrary to its standard practices.
Recently, a lawsuit claiming a violation of EMTALA's stabilization
provision was filed after a Louisiana hospital
stood by its ethical
26
principles and refused to perform an abortion.1
Generally, a hospital that knows about a patient's emergency
medical condition cannot discharge or transfer the patient before
stabilizing him, 127 regardless of whether the patient is eventually
treated in parts of the hospital other than the emergency room.2a
"Hospitals cannot circumvent the requirements of the Act merely by
admitting an emergency room patient to the hospital, then eventually
discharging that patient.' 29 But EMTALA does not mandate medical
care for an infinite duration. 130 Furthermore, the Act does not require
hospitals or physicians to cure all of the patient's ailments. 13 1 Once a
patient is stabilized, the hospital's duty under EMTALA is
extinguished, unless and until the patient experiences another

("the definition of 'to stabilize' asks whether the medical treatment...%,as reasonable under the
circumstances. This is obviously a factual inquiry ... ").
1232 BARRY R- URROW ETAL., HEALTH LAW 79 (1995).
' 24See Cherulwri, 175 F.3d at 449 (stabilization is "purely contextual or situational").
'25See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596, 597.
'26See Joe Gyan, Jr., HeartPatientSues Hospital,State Offieialsfar Denyin Abrton,
BATON 27
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Mar. 12, 1999, at 4-B.
1 See Huffine v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 979 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex.App. 1998)
'28See Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1134.
1291a
at 1135.
30

' See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 352 (after stabilizing patient and treating her for tventy days,
hospital3thad no duty to resuscitate her under EMTALA).
1 Green v. Touro Infirmary, 992 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1993); Brooker v. Dart Ho--p.
Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991); Torres Nieves v. Hospital Metropolhtano. 993 F
Supp. 2d 127, 133 (D.P.R. 1998); Watts, 962 S.W.2d at 108; Clarlz, 657 So. 2d at 747
("EMTALA requires only that a hospital stabilize an individual's medical condition and not
that it cure the patient.").

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:195

emergency condition while at the hospital. 132 Thus, after a patient is
of the patient is
stabilized, the hospital and physician's
33 treatment
governed by state law, not EMTALA.1
Sometimes it is impossible for a hospital to fully stabilize a patient
before transferring the patient to obtain care not available at the
transferring hospital. 134 In these situations, EMTALA permits transfers
of unstabilized patients where a physician or other qualified medical
person certifies in writing that the transfer is in the patient's best
interests. 135 In order for the transfer of unstabilized patients to be
appropriate, the transferring hospital must minimize the risks of
transfer as best it can. The receiving hospital must have appropriate
facilities to treat the patient and must have agreed to accept the patient,
and the transferring hospital must send to the receiving hospital all
The
medical records relating to the patient's emergency condition.
137
In
proper procedure for transferring patients is fraught with pitfalls.
one case, a plaintiff brought a suit because the doctor failed to follow
EMTALA's requirement that he summarize on the transfer certificate
138
that the medical benefits of the transfer outweighed the risks.
Recognizing that the purpose of this provision is simply to ensure that
doctors consider the risks and benefits before transferring a patient, the
Ninth Circuit permitted the doctor in question to show through extrinsic
evidence that he truly weighed the appropriate factors before
transferring the patient. 139 In another case, the Department of Health
and Human Services brought an enforcement action against a doctor
who allegedly commenced the transfer of emergency patients before
receiving the express consent of the receiving hospital. 4 0 The doctor
32

See Green, 992 F.2d at 539; Reynolds, 861 F. Supp. at 223; Clark, 657 So. 2d at 747;
Stokes, 453 S.E.2d at 505.
33
' Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351.
134Kilcup v. Adventist Health, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
13'See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii) (1994).
16See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (1994).
37
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) & (2) (1994); supra note 28.
'See Vargas, 98 F.3d at 1203.

3See id., 98 F.3d at 1205; see also Kilcup, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (Even if the
certification is not in writing, a physician may satisfy the requirement by convincing evidence
that the evaluation was made); Romo v. Union Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 837, 844
(W.D.N.C. 1995) (absence of summary does not necessarily result in EMTALA liability but
creates jury question).
'40See Cherukuri v. Shalala, 175 F.3d 446, 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
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was not ultimately fined in that case because the Sixth Circuit
recognized that EMTALA's requirement that the transferring hospital
obtain the consent of the receiving hospital only applies when the
hospital transfers an unstabilized patient.141
The bottom line is that under the language of [42 U.S.C.
§1395dd] subsections (b) and (c), including the definition of
"stabilized" in subsection (e), a physician may transfer any
emergency room patient to another hospital without any
certifications and without the express consent of the receiving
hospital if he reasonably believes that the transfer is not likely
to cause 142a "material deterioration" of the patient's
condition.

Thus, when a stabilized patient is being transferred, compliance with
these provisions is not required.
Civil Enforcement of EMTALA
Administrative Enforcentent
The federal government enforces EMTALA jointly through the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. 43 The statute provides for civil fines not to exceed $50,000
per hospital (or $25,000 where the hospital has less than 100 beds) for
each violation.144 Both hospitals and physicians are liable for financial
penalties whether they intentionally or negligently violate EMTALA.145
To date, over 700 hospitals have been subject to government
enforcement actions. 146 In fiscal 1999, the OIG collected about $1.7
million through sixty-one settlements or judgments. 147 Notably, fines
4

1 1 See id

1421d at 450.
43
1 Solicitation

of Comments on the OIG/IHCFA Special Advisory Bulletin on the Patient
Anti-Dumping Statute, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,486, 67,486 (199S).
'44See
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) (1994); Luckey, 496 S.E.2d at 540 n.2.
145See Inspector General v. Burditt, No. C-42 (HHS July 28, 1939), enforced, 934 F.2d
1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
'"6See AsPEN HEALTH LAW CeTE, ErERGENcY DEPAR .I"NT CO.pzAWe .AtuAL 23
(Rusty McNew,
ed.) (1998).
147See Chad Bowman, FederalPenaltiesfor Patient Dumping Rise: Industry Ifary of
2275, 2275 (Nov. 16, 1999). In fiscal
OIG's BroadInterpretation,68 BNA's U.S. LA V/WEEK
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imposed on physicians generally are not covered under professional
malpractice insurance policies, which greatly increases their deterrent
effect. 148 EMTALA also mandates a stiffer penalty for flagrant or
repeated violations. In such cases, EMTALA provides for exclusion of
hospitals and physicians from the Medicare program. 149 Of course, this
exclusion can be devastating, as one author has noted:
Most authorities feel that the real economic weapon of this
legislation is not the $50,000 fine but, rather, the "fast track
termination" from Medicare. The public image of the
hospital is likely to be significantly damaged when
announcements in local newspapers read that "the hospital is
in an immediate and serious150
threat to patient care and will be
terminated from Medicare."
An abbreviated outline of the administrative procedure may be
helpful. 15 1 The government enforcement process is started when a
complaint is made to HCFA or the OIG, or to a state agency that is
required to transmit the complaint to HCFA. 15 2 State agencies will
initially investigate the matter and report their findings to HCFA.' 53 If,
based on the state report, HCFA determines that a violation of
EMTALA has occurred, it will inform the offending hospital. If the
violation is considered serious (and this is a purely subjective
determination), HCFA can initiate "fast track" termination of
participation in the Medicare program. 154
This will result in
termination approximately twenty-three days after the hospital is
informed by HCFA.' 55 If the violation is not considered serious, a
process that could result in termination within ninety days is initiated

1998 the OIG netted about $1.8 in fifty-four cases. See Eric Weissenstein, HHS 1998 Fraud
Collections
Drop, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 7, 1998, at 12.
4
'See MIKEL A. ROTHENBERG, EMERGENCY MEDICINE MALPRACTICE § 1.11 (1994).
14942 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(B) (1994).
'50ROTHENBERG, supra note 148, at § 1.11.
1SSee GREGORY M. LUCE, DEFENDING THE HOSPITAL UNDER EMTALA: NEW
REQUIREMENTS/NEW LIABILITiES 4-13 (1995) (containing a more detailed discussion).
'55 2See
42 C.F.R. § 488.18(d) (1998).
3
1 See LUCE, supra note 15 1, at 4.
'S4See 42 C.F.R. § 489.53(c)(2) (1998).
'See id.
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instead. 156 Whether HCFA pursues fast track or protracted termination,
hospitals can still prevent termination by implementing changes that
If the hospital does not achieve
bring them into compliance.
compliance, it will be terminated. When a physician is going to be
excluded or civil penalties assessed against physicians or hospitals, the
peer review
Secretary must request a report from the appropriate
57
occurred.1
violation
a
whether
concerning
organizations
Regardless of whether termination from Medicare is pursued, the
OIG can pursue civil penalties. If the OIG and the offending hospital
cannot reach a settlement, the OIG must prove to an administrative law
judge (ALJ) by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of

EMTALA has occurred.15 8 As in most agency decisions, the ALJ's
tend to side with the Inspector General and make credibility

determinations accordingly.' 5

The AU's decision is appealable to an

administrative appeals board. 160 Unfortunately, the review by the
administrative board is sometimes cursory. 16 1 Adverse decisions are
then appealable to the United States Courts of Appeals, which have
broad power to review the AL's interpretations of the statute but
which may perform only a limited review of the ALJ's factual findings
under the substantial evidence standard.162
56
1 See LUCE,
57

supranote 151, at 5.

' See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(g) (1998); \VA.MAI, supra note 61, at 13; LUCE, supra note

151, at4.
'sSSee VAxMAN,supra note 61, at 12.
159See Inspector General v. Cherukuri, No. C-96-020 (HHS May 23, 1997), not enforced,
175 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 1999).
169See
Cherukuri, 175 F.3d at 448-49.
161See id at 455. This lack of substantial review led the Sixth Circuit to criticize the
Board:
It is unfortunate that the errors we have uncovered were not caught earlier in
When the administrative "Review Board"
the administrative process.
established to administer EM1TALA cases chooses without explanation to
make an ALJ decision in an important case binding without review, the burden
on the Court of Appeals to comb the record is substantially increased. We
respectfully suggest that the Board should review cases like this one closely
and should not simply pass them on to a federal appellate court without
providing a reasoned disposition of the objections raised by the parties.
Id

162See id at 449 n.l; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e) (1994). "Substantial evidence" means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
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In one of the first cases brought by the Inspector General for
patient dumping, a physician was fined $20,000 for refusing to treat a
woman in labor who also had high blood pressure. When called to treat
her, Dr. Burditt told the nurses that he "didn't want to take care of this
163
lady," and ordered her to be taken to a hospital 170 miles away.
Fortunately, neither the woman nor her child suffered any serious ill
effects from the ordeal. 164 In another case, the Sixth Circuit refused to
enforce a $100,000 fine against a physician who transferred two trauma
patients to a hospital better-equipped to deal with severe head
injuries. 165 It found that the administrative law judge misinterpreted the
meaning of "stabilize" and that there was not substantial evidence to
66
support a finding that the patients were not stabilized before transfer. 1
It also held that a physician could not be liable for failing to perform
surgery that might have stabilized the patient's medical condition when
an anesthesiologist refused to provide anesthesia for the surgery,
despite the ALJ's finding that67 the physician should have forced the
anesthesiologist to assist him. 1
PrivateLawsuits
EMTALA also provides for private lawsuits by patients claiming
violations of the statute. 168 The Act provides:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of
a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this
section may, in a civil action against the participating
hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and
such equitable relief as is appropriate. 169

See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In a substantial evidence determination,
the court of appeals reviews the entire record; however, it does not substitute its judgment for

that of the Board by reconsidering facts, re-weighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence,
or deciding
questions of credibility. See Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998).
163See Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1366, 1366.
164See id.
'65See Cherukuri, 175 F.3d at 446.
'66See id. at 455.
67
' See id. at 452.
16'See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994).
1691d "
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Although the government can pursue monetary penalties against
hospitals and physicians, 170 under the terms of the statute, plaintiffs can
17 1
only sue the hospital, and not the physician or health care workers.
The two most common claims brought under EMTALA are failure to
screen adequately and failure to stabilize an emergency medical
condition, which includes failure to stabilize before transferring the
individual. 172 These are two separate claims, so a plaintiff alleging
the hospital did not
failure to stabilize need not allege or prove that
173
provide an adequate screening, and vice versa.
An EMTALA lawsuit may be initiated in either state or federal
court. 174 Recovery is limited by the statute's ov terms to "[a]ny
individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating
hospital's violation of a requirement of [this section].. ." ' 17 Courts
have struggled with the question of who is an "individual" capable of
suing under EMTALA, 176 as this term could conceivably refer to
members of the patient's family who suffered emotional harm caused
by a violation of EMTALA. 77 But the rules of statutory construction
indicate that the term "individual" as the term is used in subsection (d),
In the other
has the same meaning as in other subsections. 17
170See Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 377 (4th Cir. 1992).
1
M
See Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir, 1995); King v
Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 271 (8th Cir. 1994); Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 3M7, 393-94 (l0h Cir
1993); Baber, 977 F.2d at 877-78; Gateuvood, 933 F.2d at 1040 n. . There is no bazis to imply
a private cause of action against the physician either. See King, 16 F.3d at 271,
'7Although uncommon, a plaintiff could conceivably make a claim for failure to transfer
him when requested, failure to accept a transferred patient, and delay in screening, stabilizing
or transferring. As the statute states, a civil action may be brought for any harm cau ed by any
"violation of a requirement of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994).
173See Urban, 43 F.3d at 526 (a plaintiff "need not show a violation of Section
1395dd(a), emergency room screening requirement, to succeed in an action brou2ht under
Section 1395dd(c)").
174See, e.g., Huffine v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 979 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App. 1993); Trivette
v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp., Inc., 507 S.E.2d 48 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Lear v. Genecee
Mem'l Hosp., 678 N.Y.S.2d 228 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
17142 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)) (1999).
176See Zeigler v. Elmore County Health Care Auth., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1326 (M.D.
1999).
Ala.
' 1 See Kilcup, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (Kilcup's adult children alleged that they cuffered
personal78harm as a result of defendant's violation of EMTALA).
1 See In re Davis, 170 F.3d 475, 4S0 (5th Cir. 1999) (en bane) ("An interpretation that
gives the same words in the same Act a different meaning 'flatly contradicts standard canons of
statutory interpretation, for the same language in a single statutory provision cannot have two
different meanings."') (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 473, 484 (1990)); Halickii v.
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subsections, it is clear that "individual" means the "individual ... [who]
1
comes to the emergency department..." seeking a medical screening, V
or "any individual [who] has an emergency medical condition..." and
seeks treatment.1 80 This term does not encompass the patient's
family. 181 Thus, only the patient denied a screening or stabilizing
treatment could recover under EMTALA. Accordingly, one court has
held that a mother could not sue under EMTALA in her individual
capacity for harm done to her infant daughter. 8 2 But other courts have
effectively disregarded the "personal harm as a direct result" language
or minimized it such that EMTALA exceeds its scope. 8 3 For example,
one court held that a hospital's delay in treating an infant prolonged her
suffering to some extent, and this was considered to be sufficient harm
to sue under EMTALA. 8 4 Some courts have gone even farther afield.
One such court allowed the mother of a patient denied an appropriate
screening and treatment to sue for the mental anguish and lost wages
she suffered. 8 5 Another court held that EMTALA does not preclude
the recovery of damages for loss of familial support and the like. 186 Of
course, survivor actions are permissible under the Act to the extent that
state law allows them, 8 7 as these actions are suits brought on the
Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1998) ("There is a 'basic cannon of
statutory construction that identical terms within an Act bear the same meaning."') (quoting

Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992)).
17 9See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
'"°See
id. at (b)(1).
1

18See Zeigler, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. The Zeigler court used legislative history to
support this conclusion. "The legislative history thus suggests quite strongly that Congress
intended to allow suit only by what the House Judiciary Committee called the 'individual
patient,' that is, the individual for whose medical condition the emergency medical examination
or treatment was sought." Id The rules of statutory construction, however, lead to the same
result without
resorting to legislative history.
82
1 See Zeigler, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
"834See., e.g., C.M., 961 S.W.2d at 242.
11 See Zeigler, 56 F. Supp. 2d at
1327.
'See id.
'86See Correa,69 F.3d at 1196 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)).

187See id.; Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Lane v.
Calhoun-Liberty County Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1543, 1552-53 (N.D. Fla. 1994);
Griffith, 826 F. Supp. at 383-84. Despite discussing survivor actions, the First Circuit in
Correaseemed to say that wrongful death actions would also be permitted under EMTALA, It
stated: "It is equally open to read the law as permitting an individual who has a special
relationship with another - say a wife deprived consortium or, as here, a bereaved relative - to
sue when she is harmed in direct consequence of an EMTALA violation inflicted upon such
other." Correa,69 F.3d at 1196.
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decedent's behalf to compensate him for personal harm he suffered
before his death.' 8s "The survival action, as it is called, is not a new
cause of action. It is rather the cause of action held by the decedent
immediately before or at death, now transferred to his personal
representative."' s9 Survival actions should be contrasted with wrongful
death actions, which should not be permitted under the Act to the extent
they are based not on the harm done to the patient, but on the loss
suffered by the family as a result of his death. 190 The Act's
"individual" and "personal harm" caveats also limit the courts' ability
to grant equitable relief,191 so that an injunction can only require
a
92
hospital to treat the particular plaintiffs seeking the injunction. 1

Unlike many other federal remedial statutes, there is no
administrative procedure that must first be exhausted, such as filing a

complaint with the HCFA.

93

There is, however, a two-year statute of

limitations. 194

This provision is strictly construed and is not tolled for
incompetency, infancy, disability, 195 or state procedural grounds. 196

EMTALA does not preempt any pendant state law claims that a
plaintiff might initiate,
including claims under comparable state
statutes.' 98 Thus plaintiffs frequently bring an EMTALA claim along

ISSSee W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 0N TiE LAW OF TOpTs § 126, at
942 (5th ed. 1984).
'9OSee Holmes v. Acands, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 36, 41 n.2 (Ind. CL App. 1999) -A v, rongful
death action is not for the benefit of the decedent, but on behalf of the decedent's suri~orY';
City of Pompano Beach v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 709 So. 2d 603, 605 (FlI. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(Wrongful death actions "are brought on behalf of the survivors, not to recover for injuries to
the deceased..."). "All American Jurisdictions except Hawaii and Massachusetts ha%c required
statutory authority for a wrongful death recovery." Powell v. American Motor- Corp., 34
S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. 1992).
' 91See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1999).
192See Hart v. Riverside Hosp., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 264,268 (E.D. Va. 1995).
'93See Power,42 F.3d at 867.
'94See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C) (1999).
195See Vogel v. Linde, 23 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1994).
1eSSee Burrows v. Turner Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 840, 843 (\1.D. Ar&. 1991)
(state law which tolls the statute of limitations for one year upon voluntary dismiszl of lavsuit
does not toll EMTALA's two-year statute of limitations).
197See Casey v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 947 S.N,2d 301, 304 (Tex. App. 1997).
"rsSee., e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2113.4 (1998).
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with numerous state law claims.' 99 EMTALA also does not preempt
state notice-of-claim laws, as long as these provisions do not directly
conflict with EMTALA's purposes.2 00 Based on this limitation, the
Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit found that Virginia's
notice-of-claim statute, which entailed administrative limitations
beyond merely giving notice, was preempted by the Act. 2 1 Similarly,
a court held that an Indiana law that required the filing of the proposed
complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance medical review
panel directly conflicted with and was preempted by EMTALA. 2
State law also governs the availability of damages and equitable
relief under EMTALA.2 °3 This includes state caps on damage
awards. 20 4 In making these limitations applicable to EMTALA claims,
"the apparent intent of Congress was to balance the deterrence and
compensatory goals of EMTALA with deference to the ability of states
to determine what limits are appropriate in personal injury actions
against health care providers. '20 5 Thus, one court held that Maine's
wrongful death cap of $150,000 was applicable to an EMTALA
claim.20 6 Of course, EMTALA also "incorporates all the vagaries of
the state medical malpractice law in the determination of the damages
recoverable in an action under the Act." 20 7 Accordingly, some courts
have held that state laws limiting damage awards for medical
malpractice apply to EMTALA,2 °8 while others have refused to so
199See, e.g., Feighery v. York Hosp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Me. 1999) (complaint
alleged claims for violations of EMTALA, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional
distress,
and medical malpractice).
200
See Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1999);
Draper201
v. Chiapuzio, 9 F.3d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
See Power,42 F.3d at 866; Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 695.
202
See HCA Health Servs. of Ind., Inc. v. Gregory, 596 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. Ct. App,
1992) (Indiana law which required the filing of the proposed complaint with the Indiana
Department of Insurance medical review panel directly conflicted with and was preempted by
EMTALA).
203
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) ("Any individual who suffers personal harm as a
direct result of a participating hospital, obtains those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the state in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is
appropriate").
2
WSee Barris,972 P.2d at 976.
20
1d. at 973.
206
See Feighery, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
207
Diaz v. CCHC-Golden Glades, Ltd., 696 So. 2d 1346, 1347 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App, 1997).
203
See Power, 42 F.3d at 861 (Virginia's $1 million cap on malpractice awards applies to
EMTALA); Lee, 778 F. Supp. at 903-04 (Indiana's limitation on malpractice recoveries applies
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hold. 20 9 But even these latter courts have said that state law limitations
will apply to EMTALA cases in which the plaintiff is "unable to show
210
anything more than a case of negligent medical malpractice."
Similarly, the California Supreme Court held California's medical
injury cap of $250,000 for non-economic losses was applicable to an
EMTALA failure to stabilize claim because if the claim were brought
under state law, the cap would have been applied.2 1 1 Addressing a
slightly different issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held that
because EMTALA claims so closely resemble medical malpractice
claims, the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund (designed to
provide coverage for medical malpractice claims) provides excess
coverage for violations of EMTALA.212 Because of EMTALA's
incorporation of state law, the plaintiff's ability to recover under the
statute will expand and contract depending on the jurisdiction where
the hospital is located. Accordingly, if the particular state law permits,
plaintiffs may recover for their pain, suffering, and humiliation. 213 For
example, in a case where the hospital failed to follow its standard
procedures in providing a medical screening of a young rape victim, the
court indicated that the patient might recover damages for lost wages,
214
mental anguish, pain and suffering, and reasonable attorneys' fees.
of whether punitive damages are
State law also controls the question
215
action.
EMTALA
an
in
available
Because courts differ on whether medical negligence results in
EMTALA liability, it is not surprising that one state court that
analogized an EMTALA claim to a malpractice claim applied
comparative fault principles. 216 Another court refused to apply the
to EMTALA claims); Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Med. Hosp., Inc., 709 F. Supp. S52, 55
(S.D. Ind. 1989) (Virginia's cap).
209
See Cooper v. GulfBreeze Hasp., Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1538, 1543 (N.D. Fla. 1993);
Spradlin
21 v. Acadia-St. Landry's Med. Found., 711 So. 2d 699, 702-03 (La. CL App. 1993).
OSee Spradlin,711 So. 2d at 702 n.5.
21
See Barris,972 P.2d at 974, 976.
212
See Burks v. St. Joseph'sHosp., 596 N.W.2d 391,402 (Wisc. 1999).
213
See C.A., 961 S.W.2d at 242.
214

215See id

See Taylor v. Dallas County Hosp. Dist, 976 F. Supp. 437, 433 (N.D.Tex. 1996)
(denying punitive damages based on state law); Griffith., 826 F. Supp. at 385 (den ing punitive
punitive damages in w'rongful death case).
damages
216 based on Kansas law which precludes
See Clark v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 657 So. 2d 741, 74349 (La. Ct. App

1995).
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doctrine, reasoning that proof of medical negligence was irrelevant to
EMTALA.217
State tort law concerning intervening agency or
superseding causes also applies to EMTALA claims. 218 For example,
in one case the patient failed to heed the hospital's instruction to see his
family physician. 219 In this failure to properly screen case, the court
ruled that this failure was a superseding cause of the patient's heart
attack that occurred three weeks after his screening at the hospital,

thereby precluding liability under EMTALA for failing to properly
screen.2
Finally as to state hospitals and Eleventh Amendment
Immunity, some courts have correctly held that Congress has not

abrogated this immunity from lawsuits in federal court, 22 1 while others
have taken the opposite view. 222

As to the federal government's

immunity from suits, one court has held that Congress did not waive
this immunity in enacting EMTALA. 2 3
THE ROBERTS CASE

The Facts
In May 1992, Wanda Johnson was brought to the emergency room at

Humana Hospital-University of Louisville in Kentucky, after suffering
severe injuries caused by a collision with a truck. 2 4 She did not
complain about the care she received, and the Hospital seems to have
217

See Griffith, 842 F. Supp. at 1365 (comparative fault is not applicable because a
plaintiff
is
218 not required to prove negligence in order to recover under EMTALA).
5ee Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 1995); Williams, 34
F.3d at21697.
9
See Williams, 34 F.3d at 696.
0
2' See id. at 697.
"2'See Ward v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1290 (D. N.M.
1999); Lebron v. Ashford Presbyterian Community Hosp., 975 F. Supp. 407, 409 (D.P.R.
1997); Isidra v. Perez-Bourdon v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 951 F,Supp. 22, 24 (D.P.R.
1997).
2
2 See Williams v. County of Cook, No. 97-C-1069, 1997 WL 428534, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (EMTALA preempts Illinois Tort Immunity Act); Etter v. Board of Trustees of N.
Kansas City Hosp., No. 95-0624-CV-W-6, 1995 WL 634472, at *2 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Helton v.
Phelps County Reg'l Med. Ctr., 817 F. Supp. 789, 791 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (EMTALA preempts
Missouri statute "which provides sovereign immunity to public entities to the extent they have
no insurance
coverage").
22
3See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (D.N.M. 1999).
4
22 See Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 111 F.3d 405, 406-07 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd,
119 S. Ct. 685 (1999).
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fulfilled its duties in treating her injuries. However, in July of 1992, a
surgical resident suggested to a social worker that she find a long-term
nursing facility for Johnson. 2 25 The resident was unaware that Johnson
did not have insurance to cover payment for Humana's treatment. 2,6 it
appeared that the resident's intentions were innocent in that he was not
motivated by a desire to deny treatment to an indigent patient. After
being rejected by two facilities, the Crestview Health Care Facility
agreed to admit Johnson, and she was transferred there on July 24,
1992. 2 Johnson's condition immediately deteriorated, and the next
day she was admitted to the Midwest Medical Center in Indiana, where
she was treated for many months. 22 3 This extensive care required cost
almost $400,000.229 Because she failed to meet Indiana's residency
requirements, Johnson was not eligible for financial assistance under
Medicaid. 23 '
In 1993, Johnson's guardian, Jane Roberts, filed a lawsuit under
EMTALA, alleging Humana failed to stabilize Johnson before
transferring her to Crestview. 231 Humana moved for summary
judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether Johnson's medical condition was stable at the time
of her transfer to Crestview, 232
or whether Humana had transferred her
based on an improper motive.
The Reasoning of the Court of Appeals
In addressing the Roberts case, the Sixth Circuit looked to its opinion
in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc. 3 3 Cleland involved
both a failure to screen and failure to stabilize claim. The hospital
misdiagnosed Cleland's illness as influenza and then discharged him.
25 See id at 407.
26See id.

27See id.
22See id.
2 9

' See Roberts, 111 F.3d at 407.
23OSee id; see also IND. CODE § 12-15-4-4 (1998) (stating eligibility requirements for
Medicaid).
2'See Roberts, I11 F.3d at 407. Roberts also alleged negligence under state lav, and
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims, and Roberts only
appealed
2 the EMTALA and negligence claims. See id

see id

233

See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Less than twenty-four hours later, Cleland suffered cardiac arrest and
died. The Sixth Circuit sought to define the term "appropriate," as in
the "appropriate medical screening examination" required by
EMTALA.
The plaintiff in Cleland argued the term "appropriate," imposed a
statutory obligation to provide an examination that did not violate state
malpractice law and which rendered a correct diagnosis. 234 In
interpreting this term, the court looked to the legislative purpose of the
statue: the prevention of the dumping of indigent patients. Because
Congress was attempting to protect the indigent from dumping, the
court reasoned that in mandating an "appropriate" screening
examination, Congress was not concerned with minimal standards of
screening or even a correct result.235 Thus, the court determined that
the term "appropriate" must "be interpreted to refer to the motives with
which the hospital acts." 236 But then the court relied on a disparate
treatment standard rather than an improper motive standard: "If it [the
hospital] acts in the same manner as it would have for the usual paying
patient, then the screening provided is 'appropriate' within the meaning
of the statute., 237 The court seems to have adopted a similar
disparate
238
treatment standard for the plaintiffs stabilization claim.
[N]either the normal meaning of stabilization, nor any of the
attendant legislative history or apparatus, indicates that
Congress intended to provide a guarantee of the result of
emergency room treatment and discharge. In the hospital's
opinion, the patient was stable, and they would have believed
that a patient
with any differing characteristicswould have
23 9
been stable.

'

4

See id. at 271.

235See

id. ("Plaintiffs essentially contend [incorrectly] that 'appropriate' denotes, at a
minimum, the full panoply of state malpractice law, and at a maximum, includes a guarantee of
a successful result.").
at 272.
2361d.
37
1d
2
SSee Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
9
23 1d. (emphasis added).
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Finally, in announcing its reasons for affirming, the Cleland court
specifically relied on24the
disparate treatment analysis, rather than the
0
one.
motive
improper
The Roberts court disregarded Cleland's disparate treatment
analysis and instead seized upon the improper motive language. As it
stated: "The District Court in the instant case properly interpreted the
Cleland holding as requiring that a plaintiff prove a hospital acted with
an improper motive in order to recover under the EMTALA.' 24 ' Also,
it rejected "the position espoused by plaintiff that, to succeed on a
claim under the EMTALA, she can prove that Humana's treatment of
Johnson was not uniform
to patients suffering from the same medical
242
Johnson."
as
condition
The Roberts court was concerned that some statutory
interpretations would "effectively require a hospital, in defense of a
claim under EMTALA, to either prove that it breached a standard of
care to an individual patient or that it breaches the applicable standard
of care with respect to all similarly situated patients." Striving to avoid
this entanglement with state malpractice law, the court chose to adopt
the motivation prerequisite: A plaintiff must show that the hospital
employee responsible for the discharge were motivated by improper
considerations, such as indigence, lack of insurance, race, sex, political
2 43
affiliation, occupation, education, drunkenness, or spite
Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that his discharge from the
hospital before being stabilized was caused by this motive.2 44 Because
the plaintiff did not prove improper motive, the court affirmed the
summary judgment for the hospital.245

240

See id.at 268. In summarizing its decision, the court made no mention of an improper

motive requirement: "we interpret the vague phrase 'appropriate medical screening' to mean a
screening
24 that the hospital would have offered to any paying patient..."
Roberts, 11 F.3d at 409.
242/d
"
243Id

2
44See
245

id at 411.
Judge David Nelson, in dissent, had no quarrel with his colleagues rationale, only with

their application of the motivation rule. He believed that the plaintiff had created a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the hospital acted with an improper motive. Soo id. at 413
(Nelson, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court Addresses Roberts
By the time the Roberts case made its way to the Supreme Court, the
Sixth Circuit was the only Circuit that had adopted the motivation
requirement. 246 Every other Circuit that addressed the question rejected
this extra element as being an extra-textual judicial construction. Thus,
it was not surprising that even the hospital's attorney conceded in its
brief and at oral argument that there was no textual basis for the
improper motive element. He stated:
[W]e do not defend the actual motive test adopted by the
Sixth Circuit because it's reasonably clear to us that there is
no basis in the text or the context of this particular statute to
justify that particular analysis. And we do not think as
hospitals that there are certainly certain situations where there
are absolute obligations that are imposed upon us, for
instance, in providing some form of a screening examination
where an inquiry into the hospital's motive is simply not an
appropriate inquiry, and on that247
basis alone, it's easy for us to
set aside the actual motive test.
Counsel for the hospital made a futile attempt to persuade the
Court to affirm on other grounds.2 48 Forty-three days after oral
argument, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in a per curiam opinion.
In analyzing the Sixth Circuit's error, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Cleland opinion first introduced the improper motivation test in
an attempt to limit the scope of EMTALA, so that it did not become a
federal malpractice statute.249 The court found that there was no textual
basis for a motivation test.2 50 It held that Section 1395dd(b) contains
no express or implied "improper motive requirement. '251 Because
there was no failure to screen claim before it, the Court refused to make
246

See A. Wade Norman, EMTALA: U.S. Supreme Court Limits Improper Motive
Doctrine
247 in PatientDumping Cases, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICs 99, 100 (1999).
Transcript of Supreme Court Oral Argument, Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., No.
97-53, 248
Carter G. Phillips, Dec. 1, 1998, available at 1998 WL 846721, at *23.
See Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 687.
249

See id. at 686. For commentary discussing the case see Thomas Helm, EMTALA:

Improper Motive Not Necessary: Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Incorporated,25 AM, J.L. &
MED 174
250 (1999).
See Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 667.
25 lid.
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231

its holding applicable to those cases.2 -2 It did, however, note that no
other Circuit adopted this test even for screening claims,
• and certainl
23
implied that there is no basis for the test in any section of EMTALA.
Despite the Supreme Court's suggestion that no part of EMTALA
contains an improper motive requirement, the Sixth Circuit still
requires plaintiffs alleging a failure to2 screen
claim to show that the
54
hospital acted with an improper motive.
ANALYSIS
While the Supreme Court was undoubtedly correct in its "plain
meaning" construction of EMTALA, the SLxth Circuit's interpretation
of Congressional intent was consistent with evidence of that intent
found in the Act's legislative history.25 5 It is universally recognized
that the statute was designed to prevent the exclusion of patients
because of their inability to pay for emergency medical care. 211 Yet the
effects of EMTALA are much greater than those envisioned by
Congress. 257 That is, while EMTALA was designed to curb the
dumping of the indigent, by its own terms, it applies to "any
individual" and not just its intended beneficiaries.253 As one court
noted: While Congress may have intended to focus on the indigent and
uninsured when it passed EMTALA, the language used was conducive
to a much broader interpretation. 259 Because of its overbreadth, the Act
regulates hospitals' treatment of all patients, regardless of their
economic status. 260 Thus, even wealthy individuals who do not need
2

S2see id

253See Roberts, 119 S.Ct. at 687 n.1.
2-4See Estate of Taylor v. Hall Regional Med. Ctr., No. 93-5052, 1999 WL 519295, at *2
(6th Cir. July 15, 1999) (per curiam).

255Regarding the dangers of using legislative history see United States v Public Ut,

Comm n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("That process seems to
me not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute.").
256See Power, 42 F.3d at 856 (EMTALA was designed to prevent patient dumping);

Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 (the "statute was designed principally to address the problem of
*patientdumping').
257See Singer, supra note 17, at 121 (By inherently raising concepts of malpractice,
COBRA's protections invite overuse by plaintiffs and misuse by the courts).
2'See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
259See Burks v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 596 N.W.2d 391, 39S (Wise. 1999).
260
See iL (In recent years EMITALA has been construed to apply to all patients,
irrespective of their ability to pay).
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special protection can sue under EMTALA whenever a hospital fails to
screen or treat them properly.
Admittedly, broad language is sometimes necessary in legislative
drafting. But in this instance, EMTALA's overbreadth may ultimately
produce effects that are at odds with the goals that Congress hoped to
attain in enacting this statute. 26 1 The most obvious problem is with the
variety of judicial interpretations (most of which enjoy some
plausibility) caused by the vagueness and overbreadth of the statute.
Thus, in attaching a motive requirement to the statute, the Sixth Circuit
sought to limit the statute which, when left unrestrained, regulates
emergency medical practices rather than just patient dumping. As one
physician has stated:
[EMTALA's] relatively short statements, describing the
institution's statutory duty, are drawn with such broad brush
strokes that they have resulted in a wide variety of judicial
interpretations regarding the precise nature and extent of a
hospital's obligations to provide emergency medical care.
This variance in the courts' rulings is a direct corollary of the
failure of the statute's language to accurately reflect the
legislative intent behind its enactments. Those courts that
choose not to require proof of improper motive are
challenged by the need to structure an alternative basis for the
imposition of liability...262
When the Sixth Circuit's improper motivation requirement is
withdrawn, EMTALA creates dilemmas for both hospitals and the
intended beneficiaries of the Act.263 One problem for hospitals is the
difficulty of knowing what exactly EMTALA proscribes and mandates.
Hospitals acting in good faith might mistakenly break the law because
its contours are undefined. This, in itself, makes portions of EMTALA
fundamentally unfair. The language of the Act entails a significant
261

See Mark J. Garwin, Immunity in the Absence of Charity: EMTALA and the Eleventh
Amendment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 5 (1998).
252Id. at 5-6.
263
See Lowell C. Brown & Shirley J. Pain, Patient Dumping by Specialized Care
Facilities: Compliance Efforts Riddled with Uncertainties, 9 No. 6 HFALTHSPAN 3 (1992)
(discussing the uncertainties that hospitals face in attempting to interpret EMTALA's vague
provisions).
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violation of the American rule of law, in that the statute fails to lay
down "the 'rules of the game' which enable individuals to foresee how
the coercive apparatus of the state will be used, or what he and his
fellow citizens will be allowed to do, or made to do, in stated
circumstances. ' ' 264 Undoubtedly, this will lead to economic waste
(from which nobody benefits and which actually harms patients) as
hospitals and physicians guess at what conduct is prohibited by the
statute.265 In an effort to avoid liability, some hospitals will do too
much by providing unneeded tests and treatment. Inevitably, however,
some other hospitals will do too little. Their common-sense definition
of an "appropriate" screening will differ from some courts'
interpretations of the same term. Of course, this has already happened,
resulting in hospitals facing EMTALA suits for conduct they could not
have known was illegal under the vague standards of the statute. 2 "
As the statute is judicially molded to take on a more definite form,
interpretative problems will no doubt subside. But troubles with
vagueness are being replaced by an even greater threat: liability for
EMTALA claims merely alleging physician negligence, and not the
intentional dumping of indigent individuals. Beyond the direct
financial losses which hospitals will suffer, this phenomenon will shift
the burden of malpractice onto hospitals and away from physicians,
thereby reducing the incentive for physicians to avoid negligent
conduct. Also, as mentioned above, some courts refuse to apply
comparative fault principles to EMTALA actions, 26 7 thus depriving
hospitals of a liability-reducing device which they might normally
enjoy in a state lawsuit for malpractice. While many will shed no tears
for the hospitals (and their perceived deep pockets), the foolishness of
this view is its failure to understand that hospitals will pass these costs
on to the consumers. Some of these consumers are indigent (and are
EMTALA's intended beneficiaries), and cannot afford to bear these
2
"FRIEDRICH A. HAYK, THE ROAD TO SE, Oi1 92 n.3 (Fiftieth Annihersary Edition
1994). 26
1"If the individuals are to be able to use their knowledge effecti%ely in mxking plans,
they must be able to predict actions of the state which may affect these plans." Id at 04.
265
See Lauren A. Dame, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act T -2
Anomalous Right to Health Care, S HEALTH MATRIX 3. 4 (1993) (noting that even ten ears
after EMTALA's enactment, attorneys debate the meaning of the statute's most basic

terminology).
267

See Griffith, 824 F. Supp. at 1364.
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costs. 268 Ironically, if EMTALA continues along this course, its own
expansive language will diminish its ability to ensure that low-income
patients receive emergency medical care. It is already working
contrary to its purpose.
Hospitals, particularly those in poverty-stricken areas, are
concerned that they will be unable to shoulder the financial burden of
EMTALA. 269
Since EMTALA's enactment, many emergency
in0
departments have closed their doors permanently, resulting 27
emergency care becoming more difficult for everyone to secure.
Delayed treatment of the indigent was one ill EMTALA sought to cure.
But the closure of emergency departments in hospitals will only add to
this problem, as patients will be transported greater distances for
emergency care. 2 71 As "patient access to high quality emergency care
limits unnecessary deaths and injuries, '272 EMTALA may actually be
resulting in greater harm to some patients.
The closure of emergency departments, in turn, results in even
greater pressure on the few urban hospitals which presently have the
As
financial resources to maintain emergency departments.2 7 3
discussed above, although it seems obvious that state hospitals enjoy
Eleventh Amendment immunity from EMTALA lawsuits, the issue has
not been completely settled by the courts. 274 Because many inner-city
hospitals are creatures of the state (and treat a large number of indigent
patients), it is possible that these hospitals will not be subject to
financial penalties for dumping patients because of the immunity they
enjoy. Without this disincentive to dump needy patients (a disincentive
that private hospitals cannot escape), some state hospitals may find it in
their best financial interests to do so. This leaves open the possibility
that inner-city state hospitals will, at best, legally burden private
268

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 409 (5th ed. 1998).
See Lewis Diuguid, Talk is Cheap in the Debate on Indigent Health Care, KANSAS

2 69

CITY STAR,
270 Apr. 24, 1999, at 15.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 96.
271
See Barry R. Furrow, An Overview and Analysis of the Impact of the Emergency
Medical
2 72Treatment andActive Labor Act, 16 1. LEGAL MED. 325, 326 (1995).
Id"
273
See id. at 354 ("Suburban hospitals, linked by telemetry systems, are likely to pass
patients on to hub hospitals with trauma units and substantial emergency department
operations.").
274
See Garwin, supra note 258, at 38 (opining that EMTALA will not withstand Eleventh

Amendment immunity).
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hospitals by dumping more patients onto them, and at worst, deny
much-needed care to the indigent.
EMTALA's expanding liability has the potential to cause other
evils. Consider, for example, the emergency patient who is completely
insured and can afford the best care available. A transfer to another
hospital with specialized care may be in his best interests. But because
the patient might die in transport or might receive less than adequate
care at the other hospital, the transferring hospital could be subject to
an EMTALA lawsuit. The financially savvy hospital, seeking to
reduce its chances of liability, might elect not to transfer patients as a
matter of general policy, thereby denying patients the expertise and
specialized care of the other hospital.27 5 Again, while there is no data
to support these hypotheses, it seems that some of EMTALA's
unintended consequences are analogous to the evils which Congress
sought to prevent through the enactment of EMTALA.
Not
surprisingly, then, many physicians have criticized EMTALA, arguing
that it is increasing the cost of providing
care while decreasing the
276
quality of care that patients receive.
The Act's overbreadth also has other societal costs. For example,
the OIG, HCFA, and state agencies are forced to investigate purported
violations of EMTALA, whether they understand "patient dumping" in
its original sense (i.e., refusing to treat indigent emergency patients) or
as it is construed under the broader terms of the statute. Thus,
enforcement efforts are wasted on the hospitals which did not dump
impoverished patients, but merely misdiagnosed or negligently treated
a patient. Because these agencies have limited budgets, hospitals truly
guilty of dumping will go unpunished while the inevitable acts of
malpractice will be punished with federal civil fines, state civil fines,
damage suits under EMTALA and comparable state statutory
provisions, and state common law malpractice claims. Moreover,
EMTALA's federalization of state malpractice law can hardly be in the
best interest of our federal judicial economy, 277 as federal courts are
27

sWhile it is true that EMTALA probably provides a cause of action for failing to

transfer, there are no reported cases involving this claim, indicating that the chance3 of a claim
for wrongful transfer are much greater than for failure to transfer
276Mary McGrath, Doctors Denounce Law on ER Pationt-Dumping,O .mA
%Voa HERALD,
277 Apr. 26 1999, at 10.

This federalization of malpractice law also raised concerns about rcspect for slate
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already burdened by Congress's increasing tendency to federalize
crimes.278 Further, it is "at least controversial to say that Congress has
the power to federalize the tort of medical malpractice. ' ' 21 In short,
while nearly everyone concedes that Roberts was correctly decided,
and was a victory for strict statutory construction, to the extent that it is
a rejection of efforts to restrict the scope of EMTALA, its effect was
not a victory for the constructors of the statute, state law, or the Act's
intended beneficiaries. As commentators have noted, the statute itself
is severely flawed:
EMTALA's flaws far exceed its limited virtues. The statute
is sloppily drafted, and the most important words are
undefined or defined far too broadly. The premise of the
statute is silly at best; one cannot impose open-ended
obligations of this sort on private parties and expect them to
meekly comply, and the inevitable adaptive responses make
everyone worse off. The private right of action effectively
creates a federalized medical malpractice regime with the
distinct tendency to reward the wrong people. When the
EMTALA, its aims and tactics
federal government enforces
280
leave much to be desired.

Recognizing these undesirable effects that EMTALA's
overbreadth has engendered, some courts have sought to judicially
modify the Act. Accordingly, some courts have refused to grant relief
under EMTALA unless an individual could show that he was indigent
when dumped,28 ' or as in Roberts, that the hospital acted with an
improper motive. While it is unquestionably beyond the judicial
function to redress the shortcomings of EMTALA,28 2 it is within the
sovereignty.
278
For discussion of the evils of federalizing criminal law see Edwin Mease, III, Big
Brother on the Beat: The ExpandingFederalizationof Crime, 1T x. REV. L & POL'Y 1, 3, 22

(1997).

279Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress Over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995
B.Y.U.L.
28 REv. 731, 778.
David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8
HEALTH
MATRiX 29, 30 (1998).
2 1
1 See, e.g., Coleman, 711 F. Supp. at 348; Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at 435-36.
282
0f course, it is the duty of courts "to give effect to the intent of Congress." Takao
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922).
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courts' power to adopt a narrow, common sense interpretation of the
statutory text to ensure that its purpose is served.2 3 The problem is not

that courts misunderstand EMTALA's purpose, as they have generally
recognized that "EMTALA does not create liability for malpractice
based on a breach of national or community standards of care; at the
core, it aims at disparate treatment." 234 But the "mere declarations by
the court[s] that the Act did not federalize malpractice does not change
the fact that the determination of that which is 'reasonably calculated to
identify critical medical conditions' will inevitably require expert
medical testimony in a manner indistinguishable from malpractice
litigation." 2s5 Mere lip service to the idea that EMTALA is not a
malpractice statute does the indigent no service.
The real task lies in devising standards based on the text of the Act
which serve EMTALA's goal of preventing patient dumping, but which
do not punish medical malpractice or at least minimizes EMTALA's
intrusion into the malpractice field.23 6 Sometimes, less is better. Thus,
in EMTALA's context this means limiting the scope of the Act to its
text and purposes. Despite notions to the contrary, this limited scope is
ultimately in the best interests of those who might need EMTALA's
protections and all emergency patients who require prompt treatment.
Not surprisingly, then, even those who object to the judicial limitation
on private cause of action, whether or not they believe that these
limitations are required by the statute, recognize that they are designed
to achieve Congress's purpose in enacting EMTALA. 87
Applying these principles to the familiar cases, in failure to
adequately screen claims, courts should follow the majority of Circuits
in rejecting a negligence standard of care, 283 or its cousin, a standard
83As the Supreme Court has stated: "Ve need not leave our common fensa at tha
doorstep when we interpret a statute." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 220. 240 1939)
"'1Brooks,
996 F.2d at 713.
2s5 Garwin, supra note 253, at 16 (footnote omitted).
2s6As one court noted, it is "inescapable that at least some EMITALA violations are
medical malpractice claims." Burks v. St.Joseph's Hosp., 596 N.\.2d 391, 401 (VWze, 19991
ZSTSee Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 114243 (th Cir. 1996)
(Heaney, J., dissenting) ("In light of Congress' intent to address patient 'dumping' in en2cting
EMTALA, the majority is understandably frustrated by the plain language of the -tatute It;
limitation of the statute's application perhaps even meets Congress' objeetive than the lar,
enacted by Congress").
2
SSSee, e.g., Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117; Collins, 963 F.2d at 307. Gate%-rowd,933 F.2d at
1039.
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which requires courts to determine whether the examination was
"reasonably calculated to identify critical conditions..." 28 9 Requiring
hospitals to meet these standards, while perhaps laudable on one level,
is neither compelled nor suggested by the text or purposes of
EMTALA. 29 0 Furthermore, misdiagnosis (the essence of many failure
to screen claims) is a common problem in American emergency
rooms. 29 1 "Patients with apparently trivial complaints are often
dismissed from emergency departments with their true conditions
undiagnosed., 292 State medical malpractice law already provides a

sufficient remedy for misdiagnosis, and thus a strong disincentive for
such conduct. Not surprisingly, "over two-thirds of emergency medical
malpractice suits involve the failure of the emergency physician to
diagnose a condition." 293 Thus, there is little need for EMTALA to
regulate such conduct. While the federal government arguably has an
interest in preventing patient dumping, an extensive "federal interest in
malpractice is doubtful... ',294 Thrusting EMTALA into the medical
malpractice fray merely adds another layer of complication to the
law.295 Thus, in failure to stabilize and transfer cases, the purposes of

EMTALA are ill-served by foisting liability on hospitals that have no
knowledge (and perhaps could not have knowledge) of a patient's
emergency medical condition. 296 By rejecting a negligence standard of
289

See Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192.
EMTALA "was not enacted to remedy negligent diagnosis..." Afelver, 1999 WL
395391, at *1.
290

29 1

See

RAYMOND M. FISH & MELVIN E. EHRHARDT,

PREVENTING EMERGENCY

MALPRACTICE
54 (1989).
292
1d
293 "
1d
294
Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38
ARiz. L.
29 3Rav. 917, 922 (1996).
See, e.g., Derry v. Peskin, No. 971720A, 1999 WL 1204013, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Nov. 16, 1999). In Peskin, the Derrys sued the physician in charge of a hospital's Ob/Gyn
department after their son was born dead. The Derrys claimed that Dr. Peskin violated
EMTALA because his department failed to provide an appropriate screening, failed to stabilize

the emergency medical condition, and improperly transferred Mrs. Derry while she was in
labor. Although Dr. Peskin was not even present at the hospital when Mrs. Derry presented
herself and was transferred, the court refused to grant summary judgment because "Dr.
Peskin's responsibilities with regard to the Department's compliance with EMTALA may have
created a personal duty to the Derrys." Id. EMTALA does not create liability for directors of
medical departments who fail to instruct subordinates on the duties of EMTALA, so the Peskin
court was
296 incorrect to the extent it held otherwise.
See, e.g., Carodenuto,593 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
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care for EMTALA claims, courts serve the purposes of the Act and
help to minimize the overbreadth of the statute.
Courts could further serve the text of the statute by applying the
Act's own prohibition of lawsuits except those by "[a]ny individual
who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's
violation of a requirement" of EMTALA.297 As discussed above, a
proper interpretation of this phrase would permit only those patients
who were denied a screening or stabilizing treatment to sue for a
violation of the statute. Any harm to the family is (1) not suffered by
the individual patient; and (2) not a direct result (but only a secondary
one) of the EMTALA violation. Judicial enforcement of this limitation
would, therefore, preclude wrongful death actions to the extent they
compensate the decedent's family and not the EMTALA victim.
Furthermore, using this proviso, courts could dismiss actions seeldng
damages for emotional pain to the family of the patient, as the
individual patient's harm is the only harm compensable under the terms
of the statute.
Some courts have suggested imposing a temporal limitation on the
stabilization requirement.
As the First Circuit noted: "Requiring
hospital-wide stabilization of individuals with emergency medical
conditions raises the question of how long subsection (b)'s stabilization
obligation persists. If stabilization were mandated by EMTALA
without limit of time, it might well encroach upon the province of state
malpractice law." 299 Thus, the Fourth Circuit has held that "the
stabilization requirement was intended to regulate the hospital's care of
the patient only in the immediate aftermath of the act of admitting for
emergency treatment and while it considered whether it would
undertake longer-term full treatment or instead transfer the
patient..." 30 0 This temporal limitation seems to be implicit in the text
of the statute, as the obligation to stabilize arises immediately after the
hospital "determines that the individual has an emergency medical

29742

U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994).

2

=SSee Lopez-Soto, 175 F.3d at 177 n.4; Bryan, 95 F.3d at 352.
... Lopez-Soto,
30

175 F.3d at 177 n.4.
OBlyan, 95 F.3d at 352.
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condition." 30 As a secondary consideration, this limitation is certainly
in accordance with the original purpose of EMTALA.3 °2
Beyond serving EMTALA's purposes and curing overbreadth,
these limitations and standards help prevent the needless cluttering of
the courts with lawsuits seeking to punish unintentional and sometimes
unpreventable misdiagnoses and treatment based on misdiagnoses.
Such lawsuits serve no purpose other than to bring EMTALA into
disrepute among those who are governed by it. While some might find
this a minor point, hardly worth mentioning, because hospitals and
physicians have powerful congressional lobbyists (by which these and
similar laws may be repealed), it is important to the purposes of
EMTALA that this law have at least a semblance of reasonableness.
Laws which are applied in an overly expansive fashion face a greater
danger of legislative repeal or amendment, or as in the case of Roberts,
judicial amendment. 30 3 This is not to say that some tinkering with
EMTALA would not produce beneficial consequences for all parties
involved-hospitals, physicians, patients, lawyers, the courts and
taxpayers. In fact, many lawyers have suggested various ways to
amend EMTALA.3 °4 Among the more palatable suggestions is the
3042 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994).
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But recall that it was the desire to serve that original purposes of EMTALA that got
the appellate panel in trouble in Roberts. Importantly, the temporal limitation has more than
this to hang its hat on, as the text of the statute seems to presuppose this limitation. Thus, this
caveat 303
is distinguishable from the motive one employed in Roberts.
There has been a suggestion that Congress amend EMTALA to require proof of an
economic motive. See Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Afedical Treatment &
Active LaborAct: Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1122-23 (1992) (suggesting that the Act be amended to require
proof of economic motive). But judging motives is always difficult. A better approach would
make proof of indigence an element of an EMTALA claim.
304

See, e.g., GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE MARKET 85

(1998) ("Congress should have included the phrase 'consistent with reasonable medical
standards' in its requirement for patient stabilization in the emergency department."); Mark
Strasser, The Futility of Futility?: Life, Death and Reasoned Public Policy, 57 MD. L. REV.
505, 509 (1998) (suggesting that Congress amend the Act to "clarify what it intends EMTALA
to include" such as "specifying that the Act is intended to apply only to indigent care"); Singer,
supra note 17, at 160 (amend the Act to define "appropriate screening examination" as one that
is free from gross misconduct); Scott B. Smith, Note, The CriticalCondition of the Emergenc'
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: A Proposed Amendment to the Act After In the
Matter of Baby K, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1491, 1527-28, 1529 (1995) ("Congress should amend its
sloppy legislation," by eliminating "the inconsistency between the Act's original intent and its
statutory language"); Rosenstein, supra note 19, at 291 (Congress should improve definitions
of terms).
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requirement that a plaintiff prove his indigence as an element of an
EMTALA claim. Further, practitioners and hospitals would warmly
receive definitions of such terms as "appropriate medical screening
examination" which reflect Congress's intent to protect the uninsured.
Thus, an appropriate medical screening could easily be defined as a
medical examination of such type and quality as the hospital or
physician in question would normally give to similarly situated patients
without regard to the patient's financial or insurance status. Finally, a
"conscience" provision which protects physicians and hospitals for
consider morally repugnant would
refusing to perform practices 3they
05
also prevent senseless lawsuits.
Assuming that Congress will not amend the Act in the near
future,306 courts must apply EMTALA so as to achieve its purpose as
they are embodied in the text of the statute. In performing this task, the
courts must avoid the temptation, highlighted in Roberts, requiring
plaintiffs seeking to establish an EMTALA claim to allege elements not
contemplated by the text of the statute. 30 7 At the same time, the
temptation of other courts to expand the reach of EMTALA to the
domain of state malpractice law and beyond must similarly be
curtailed. Emergency medical care is a vital part of the American
health care system. EMTALA has the potential to ensure that the
indigent receive the same emergency care that paying patients receive.
At the same time, the legal and medical societies must realize that the
Act has necessary limitations, and that it cannot be expected to cure
emergency medical malpractice. 30s Only when these limitations are
recognized will the force of EMTALA be brought to bear on the evils
of patient dumping.
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See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting tle Rights of Consciencc of Health Care
Providers, 14 J. LEGAL IED. 177 (1993) (discussing the need for "conscience clauses" in
and regulations).
statutes305

This is a safe assumption. Rather than rushing to fix a broken statute, Congress is

proposing new legislation which incorporates by reference the vague language of EMTALA.
See Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1999, S. 517, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999)

(incorporating by reference EMTALA's requirement of an appropriate medical screening
examination).
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As

mentioned above, the Sixth Circuit still requires plaintiffs in screening cazes to

allege an improper motive, despite the fact that there is no textual support for this requirement.
See Estate of Taylor, 1999 WL 519295, at *2.

303As many courts have repeated time and again, "'EMTALA' is not a federal

malpractice statute." Mclver, 1999 WL 395391, at *2.
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